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Abstract

The standards by which we assess the legitimacy of knowledge production are deeply biased: resting ideologically, systemically, and formally on processes that are deeply rooted
in systems of oppression. Consequently, our current body of “legitimate” or scholarly
knowledge presents only a partial, partisan picture of what it is possible—and worthwhile—to know. This thesis addresses how hegemonic institutions (like the academy)
rely on two central notions: (1) that their methods are “objective,” “value-neutral,” or
otherwise impartial (2) that these methods are the best—if not the only—ones through
which “real” knowledge may be accessed and communicated. As this paper demonstrates, each of these assumptions is gravely flawed, and reliance upon them maintains
hegemonic institutions’ ideologically biased monopoly on “truth.” Such a monopoly
excludes ways of knowing that might challenge these institutions’ power—power that
is wrapped up in systems like white supremacy, sexism, heterosexism, and capitalism. It
is systems like these that hegemonic processes of knowledge production are, ultimately,
designed to uphold. Practitioners and advocates of both arts based research and queer
theory have each levied critiques and resistances to this hegemonic system of knowledge production. As such, this thesis proposes that arts based research and queer theory
have much to offer one another. To combine these approaches is to affirm the possibility
of knowledges that are local, situated, unstable, unspeakable, and contradictory, and to
imagine worlds outside the oppressive systems that invisibly structure our lives.
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Introduction

Unlike many of my peers, I came to the work of art education not from a fine-arts background, but a liberal arts one—specifically, Gender, Women’s, and Sexuality Studies
(GWSS). I’d chosen to pursue the GWSS track in part because of a teenaged crisis of
conscience: my other interests, in English, in Art, felt self-indulgent and self-serving. I
wanted to understand the wider world in all its complex social processes, and I wanted
to leave college—as so many of us imagine we will—poised to change the world for
the better. GWSS’s explicitly interdisciplinary, explicitly political frameworks afforded
me the opportunity to move through curricular material in a way that put my curiosity
and my conscience in the driver’s seat. This pathway characterized my undergraduate
experience as one of immense personal, intellectual, and political growth. Postmodern
feminism and queer theory were frameworks that I found particularly fruitful; they were
sites where challenge and critique of the academic framework in which our learning
took place was not only accepted, but encouraged—and recognizing the flaws and limits of the academic model allowed me to (as I tell my own students), “Take what’s useful
and leave the rest behind.”
The intellectual practices I learned from GWSS served me well. They left me feeling
academically and politically empowered, equipped with critical tools with which to confront a wider social world characterized by systems of domination and oppression. I
attempted to import these practices when I began teaching Creative Writing, Memoir
1

Writing, and Gender Studies at the Iowa Correctional Institute for Women, a mid/
max security state women’s prison down the interstate from my rural Iowa college.
In witnessing my students transform experience to art to social theory, I was forced to
revisit my freshman assumption—that artistic and literary pursuits were inherently less
intellectually rigorous, less related to the “real world” than was knowledge created in
other disciplines. It was in that space that my interest in arts based teaching and learning
was sparked.
When, in graduate school, I first encountered the concept of “arts based research,” I
was overcome with a sense of deja vu. The process, the politics, the reassuring emphasis
on questioning, opposition, complication, and dissent; it seemed to me that arts based
research was a methodology that resonated clearly with the critical frameworks I’d come
to know and love—particularly queer theory. When placed adjacent, I imagined, queer
and arts based approaches could regard each other as dual mirrors: projecting infinite
space and possibility for whatever was set between them, giving a glimpse into dimensions heretofore obscured, unrealized, perhaps even unimagined. It is that space—and
the need for it—that this thesis investigates.
A web of interconnected, inter-reliant systems of domination structures the social context of academia—each with a vested interest in maintaining a restrictive and oppressive status quo (and thus, in protecting their institutional power). Social institutions like
schools, universities, and the academic profession hold a monopoly over “legitimate”
knowledge production, and the formal, philosophical, and linguistic systems they produce have effects that extend far beyond the confines of the “ivory tower.” Such monopolies are complicit in producing not just conceptions of reality, but also our lived, material experience of reality—meaning that biased processes of knowledge production
can often translate directly to material processes of oppression and domination. These
systems and institutions are responsible for creating and disseminating new knowledge
as well as educating new knowledge-makers—meaning that there is an urgent and practical need for the intervention and expansion of counterhegemonic frameworks and
methodologies with which to approach the inextricable projects of knowledge production and education.
2

While I am reluctant to engage the often-hyperbolic language of the “revolutionary,” I
do hope to provide a framework to aid future artists/researchers/educators in continuing to resist these limited, entrenched, and oppressive formulations of both teaching
and knowing. Such a framework would invite the contradictory, the political, and the
unknowable into our conceptions of truth and knowledge (and thus into our classrooms). It would embrace what is messy, unlearn first, move in all directions toward
ever-receding horizons, and acknowledge that the fictive destination is merely an engine
for ground covered, mapped, and re-mapped. This thesis will provide a framework from
which scholars, artists, teachers, learners, and all combinations of the above may build
methods of knowing that respond to the world as it is—and what it might be—rather
than reify a world that recognizes as real only that which its favored methodologies can
make known.
If these aspirations seem abstract, I cannot argue. And yet, I hope you’ll bear with me.
As this thesis will demonstrate, the abstract is not as divorced from the practical, empirical world as one might be tempted to assume. As Anne Makus notes in her analysis of
Stuart Hall’s conception of “ideology”: “Ideologies… create the lived realities of their
subjects” (Makus 1990, p. 500). How might we adjust our practices—as scholars, as
teachers, as artists—to begin to disassemble the epistemological and ontological constructs that blind us to other possibilities, alternate formulations, and more pluralistic
approaches to creating the knowledge that constructs our worlds?
To avoid an [ideological] agenda an artist/researcher must understand making art as a process
of discovery. She or he must be willing to be educated—indeed to be transformed—in that
process. The arts based researcher is therefore incomplete and developing, a reader of her own
writing. (Barone & Eisner, 2011, p. 134)

While the goal of excising ideological agendas from research may not be a productive or
even possible one, Barone and Eisner’s formulation is still worth considering while engaging with this work. Regarding myself as both a teacher and a student of this project,
I have constructed the form of this thesis in such a way as to systematically interrogate
my own understanding of the subjects at hand, complicate my own assumptions, and
3

challenge myself—as I propose challenging others—to seek out new critical, and ethical
ways of processing, critiquing, and producing knowledge. Drawing from a combination
of traditional and nontraditional sources—scholars, theorists, artists, poets, images, and
friends—and presenting my analyses, thoughts, and findings in a way that resists the
compulsory, standardized format that “research” ought supposedly to take, it is my aim
to cultivate a space that both demands and rewards reader engagement, denies the
simplicity of a linear, hierarchical, “cause-effect” model, and invites the reader to think
more expansively and critically about what we know and how we know it.

maintain their own power and supremacy—primarily using examples of sexism, white
supremacy, and heteronormativity—this chapter seeks to expose the tenuous logic and
unstable ground upon which those systems rest.

The form of this thesis is also intended as both a risk and a demonstration. At the start
of this project, I did not know what course my inquiry would take, nor where it would
land. While I hypothesized some sort of connection between the ideas I wanted to explore, I knew that the possibilities presented by these connections could only be assessed
through the process of assembly. This was a scary prospect; it required me to confront
the possibility that at the end of this project—the hours of work, the pages composed,
the caffeine mainlined—I may come to find that these ideas were not as related as I’d
hoped. In centering my work on process rather than product, I risked coming up empty.

The second chapter explores the resonances between the theoretical framework of queer
theory and the methodological framework of arts based research in an effort to demonstrate just one site of potential collaboration where counterhegemonic approaches to
education and knowledge production might blossom. This particular example aims to
emphasize the complementary elements of these approaches; how each might be leveraged to patch up the other’s shortcomings. I do not intend to advocate exclusively
for this specific combination of approaches. Rather, I aim to show the damage caused
by our limited framework of knowledge-producing practices, and thus to advocate for
their expansion. The formulation I offer is intended to demonstrate that arts based
knowledge—including, but not limited to, Arts Based Research—can be crucially leveraged toward this goal. If wielded within deliberately counterhegemonic frameworks,
this approach has the potential to produce dissenting knowledges that do not concede
the “home field advantage,” if you will, to hegemonic formulations.

The flip side to any risk, of course, is the possibility of reward. Working through the
ideas and material, following the paths they led, and drawing from a broad variety of
sources has forced me to recognize the generative value of, for lack of a better term, the
creative process. And while I do not believe I’ve come up empty, this process of “teaching myself ” through the material has provided at least as much insight into the practice
of education as the examination of the content itself. I hope that in plotting their own
paths through this work, readers will, in some way, share not just the product of my
learning, but its process as well.

It may seem to some that this paper seeks to sidestep the stated disciplinary concern
of “Art Education.” But if the process of creating this thesis has done anything, it has
occasioned me to converse deeply—with myself, my classmates, my professors, and my
sources—about how a practice of art education might contribute to broader projects
of social liberation on a structural scale. It is only by first stepping back to contextualize
the work we do as educators within the broader social frameworks and the institutions
that we must work within that we can begin to set an agenda for what it is that an art
education can do.

The first chapter of this thesis aims to map out the present predicament of institutional
knowledge production in the U.S., particularly through institutions (like universities)
that claim responsibility for both the production of knowledge (scholarship) and the
production of knowledge producers (education). In exposing the sophisticated processes by which these institutions collude with broader systems of social domination to
4
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How to Read This Book

The processes that this thesis seeks to describe constitute a deeply inter-reliant network
of institutions and systems. As such, a strictly linear written structure necessarily warps
the reader’s understanding of these processes—consciously or unconsciously placing
them within a strict, sequential hierarchy. In order to mitigate the effects of this linearity
on readers, and to offer them (you!) a degree of flexibility as to how they move through
the material presented here, Chapter 1 takes on a nonlinear structure that highlights
the ways in which each of the processes discussed relates to and relies upon the others.
To read: Begin with “Homepage: How Hegemonies Work.” When you encounter a
“link,” that is, an underlined, colored word or phrase, you have the option of referring
to the section header of that same color to further explore the concept (the sections
are also color coded in Table of Contents for your navigational convenience). You may
choose to follow these links “down the rabbit hole,” if you will, or flip back and continue
reading from where you left off. Conclude Chapter 1 with “Where the Rubber Hits the
Road: Material Harms of Hegemonic Processes,” before continuing to Chapter 2.
Margin notes, indicated by an ink splotch ( ) provide relevant definitions, clarifications,
or otherwise marginal additions.
Finally, as we will see, hegemonies have a tricky way of obscuring themselves. Chapter
6
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1 will alert the reader to “signal phrases” for hegemony’s many aliases and
disguises, but if you see the mustachioed mask in the margins (e.g. Fig. 1),
it’s a sign that hegemonies may be lurking nearby. Keep a weather eye
out, dear reader, and now: proceed as you please.
Figure 1:
“A Clever
Disguise,” Zoe
Schein,
2017

Chapter 1
Homepage: How Hegemonies Work
Children make the best theorists, since they have not yet been educated into accepting our routine social
practices as ‘natural,’ and so insist on posing to those practices the most embarrassingly general and
fundamental questions, regarding them with a wondering estrangement we adults have long forgotten.
Since they do not yet grasp our social practices as inevitable, they do not see why we might not do things
differently.
— Terry Eagleton, The Significance of Theory, 1991
For just because one loves blue does not mean that one wants to spend one’s life in a world made of it.
‘Life is a train of moods like a string of beads, and as we pass through them they prove to be many-colored lenses which paint the world their own hue, and each shows only what lies in its focus,’ wrote
Emerson. To find oneself trapped in any one bead, no matter its hue, can be deadly.
					
— Maggie Nelson, Bluets, 2009
Structurally speaking, the triangle is one of the strongest geometric shapes. It bears
great weight with little risk of rupture—making it a fundamental unit for engineering.
It is the only polygon with this particular integrity; indeed, when squares or rectangles
must be used, they’re augmented with a diagonal beam—functionally transforming
them into abutting triangles. (Reference, n/d).
It is in part their triangular form that gives hegemonies their strength as well. Simply
8
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put, hegemonies are structured by three points: (1) dominant (2) naturalized (3) ideology.
Dominant - Exercising chief authority or rule: ruling, governing, commanding; most influential.
Naturalized (phil.) - A programme of epistemology… which studies the formation of knowledge
as a natural phenomenon rather than as a rational process.
Ideology - A systematic scheme of ideas, usually relating to politics, economics, or society and
forming the basis of action or policy; a set of beliefs governing conduct.
(All definitions sourced from the Oxford English Dictionary online database: Accessed March
4, 2017.)

That is to say, hegemonies are systems of thought—or elements of those systems—that
are so widely and powerfully held that they appear not to be systems of thought at all,
but objective, natural fact.
See: homosexuality is unnatural.
See: complete list of genders: man, woman.
See: European culture is “developed.”
See: Eastern and Native cultures are “primitive.”
See: science is objective.
See: truth is objective.
Hegemonies organize. Hegemonies obfuscate. You can see the hierarchies already
emerging. Straightness is natural, queerness is not. Men and women are legible, and
therefore sensical; trans*, intersex, genderqueer are scribbled, confused, confusing.
Western cultures drive toward completion. Others languish, unfinished. Truth is structured by objectivity; science is the one door in and out. Everything else is just decoration.
In her 1990 analysis of Gramscian scholar Stuart Hall’s theory of ideology, Anne Makus
writes:
Hall argues that the legitimacy of an ideological claim depends on that part of the truth which
it takes for the whole truth, and that these particular and partial constructions are taken to be
natural and real phenomena. That is, they are represented as what is transparent, inevitable, and
wholly natural. The ideological moment occurs when codes have become profoundly naturalized, when through
habitual use they have developed an appearance of equivalence with their referents so that instant recognition occurs. “Everybody knows,” for example, what democracy is. (p. 498, emphasis mine)

Through the process Hall describes, ideology acts as a parasitic synecdoche: instead of
10

a part representing the whole, the part displaces and becomes the whole. Heterosexuality is natural to the exclusion of the possibility of other “natural”
sexual identities and practices. Men and women are legible genders to the
exclusion of trans* and intersex identities. The legitimacy of the scientific
method casts doubt and aspersion on the legitimacy of other methods of
knowledge production. The representation of these ideological claims as
“transparent, inevitable, and wholly natural… tender[s] whole ‘logics’ as the
common sense of the culture,” (Makus, 1990, p. 498). In this way, ideologically constructed “common sense” comes dangerously to stand—in this web
of interlocking ideologies—for “truth.”
These commonsensical “truths” reify themselves in an ongoing cycle of
self-reference. Like M.C. Escher’s “Drawing Hands,” (Fig. 2) which draw
each other into existence, the evidences that such ideologies offer to prove
their legitimacy rely heavily on those ideologies themselves. To take a familiar example, consider this reading of the 2005 nature documentary March of
the Penguins, offered by queer scholar and critic Judith Halberstam in their
2011 book The Queer Art of Failure:
Despite the astonishing footage, the glorious beauty of the setting and the birds
themselves, The March of the Penguins ultimately trains its attention on only a fraction of the story of penguin communities because its gaze remains so obstinately
trained upon the conforming spectacle of ‘the couple,’ ‘the family unit,’ ‘love,’
‘loss,’ heterosexual reproduction, and the emotional architecture that supposedly
welds all these moving parts together. However, the focus on heterosexual reproduction is misleading and mistaken, and ultimately it blots out a far more compelling story about cooperation, collectivity, and nonheterosexual, nonreproductive
behaviors.
Several skeptical critics remarked that, amazing as the story might be, this was not
evidence of romantic love among penguins, and ‘love’ was targeted as the most
telling symptom of the film’s annoying anthropomorphism. But heterosexual reproduction, the most insistent framing device in the film, is never questioned either by the filmmakers or the critics. Indeed Christian fundamentalists promoted
the film as a moving text about monogamy, sacrifice, and child rearing. And this
despite the fact that the penguins are monogamous for only one year, and that
they promptly abandon all responsibility for their offspring once the small penguins have survived the first few months of arctic life. (p. 38-9)

11

B.O.L.O.: Looking
for hegemony? Try
its known aliases
and associates:
“common sense,”
“natural fact,”
“value-free,”
“master narrative,”
“dominant thought,”
“traditional approaches.”

Halberstam, who
goes by “Jack” or
“Jude” but publishes
under “Judith”
has this to say on
pronouns: “So, if
you are wondering
about my pronoun
use and would like
it resolved once
and for all, I cannot
help you there…
consider my gender
improvised at best,
uncertain and
mispronounced
more often than
not, irresolvable
and ever-shifting”
(Halberstam, 2012).
For the purposes of
this thesis, I will use
the gender neutral
singular “they/them”
when referring to
Halberstam, as
well as in instances
of the non-specific third person
singular.

The narrative of the penguin-family seems comfortably to naturalize our
own human practices of monogamy, heterosexual reproduction, and the
nuclear family unit. The nature documentary, which as a genre purports
to describe to us human viewers the lives and behaviors of non-human
animals (and, significantly, represents an established site of collaboration
between artistic and scientific inquiry), in fact performs—as any narrative
does—an act of selective truth-telling. In focusing its selection narrowly on
those penguins which seem to most closely conform to Western human society’s “ideal” relationships (read: heterosexual, monogamous, reproductive),
and selecting from within that group only the narrow window of time in
which their behaviors best mimic those of this ideal family unit, March of
the Penguins offers a narrative that strongly implies that these human organizations of social and romantic life are, to again borrow Makus’ language,
“transparent, inevitable, and wholly natural.” And yet, invisibly, it is
because of those human practices that such a narrative resonates with us as
“truth” against all other possible penguin narratives.
I do not mean to imply a vast, heterosexual conspiracy. Rather, I mean to
show that hegemonies operate in much the same way as the scientific notion
of “confirmation bias.” “[I]deological representation cannot be explained
by the inclinations of individuals, nor can the motive of trickery be necessarily assigned to it,” Makus explains (2011, p. 500). Rather, “underlying presuppositions” unconsciously make their way into discourse, unchallenged
and invisible since ideology “produces in its subjects and consumers a recognition of what is already known,” and therefore, need not be proven. These
suppositions are “proffered as truths,” rather than contextual products of
historical, social, and political conditions. Erased of their contexts, such suppositions may be interpreted as “natural, inevitable, and eternal truths,”
may in turn be used to legitimate status quo narratives and practices, and,
by extension, legitimate the social conditions they produce (Makus, 2011, p.
498). Instead of conspiracy, then, an elision. The unconscious omission of
12

Figure 2: “Drawing Hands,” M.C. Escher, 1948.
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contradictory evidence—of evidence that does not fit the narrative of what is already
“known” and valued. In this way, hegemonic ideologies—disguised as natural, objective
fact—operate directly to buttress and legitimate status quos inevitably invested with
the interests of those powerful institutions—schools, universities, and the academy for
example—that, linked to individual consciousness or not, control the production and
dissemination of hegemonic knowledge (or, as we likely know it better, “knowledge”).

The Academy
Charged with the dual task of producing knowledge and producing knowledge producers, the particular position of the university as an institution again recalls Escher’s
“Drawing Hands”: education is deeply implicated in the process of knowledge making.
No matter how noble the intention—knowledge for knowledge’s sake, knowledge for
the betterment of mankind, perhaps—universities remain locked in systems of power and capital that inevitably produce interests that conflict with these noble intentions. Universities’ viability as institutions rely on the production of both wealth and
prestige—prestige measured by standards that academic communities themselves have
developed. Given the competitive, hyperproductive ethos that characterizes academic
culture and often determines the course of individual careers, deviation from these
standards presents a risk that is, for many, too great to chance. Halberstam writes:
The desire to be taken seriously [in academia] is precisely what compels people to follow the
tried and true paths of knowledge production around which I would like to map a few detours.
Indeed terms like serious and rigorous tend to be code words, in academia as well as other contexts,
for disciplinary correctness; they signal a form of training and learning that confirms what is
already known according to approved methods of knowing, but they do not allow for visionary
insights or flights of fancy. (2011, p.6)

Indeed, “serious” and “rigorous” are gatekeeping words, functioning to patrol the borders that bound “legitimate” knowledge, which, in many ways, universities themselves
are relied upon to define. The policing of these boundaries has consequences that reach
14

15

far beyond the context of the university, however. In his work on Foucault’s discussions
of education, Roger Deacon explains:
Universities, like schools, are multifaceted amalgamations of economic, political, judicial and
epistemological relations of power, which still reflect the exclusionary and inclusionary binaries of their origins: university campuses are relatively artificial enclaves where students are
expected to absorb socially desirable modes of behaviour and forms of knowledge before being
recuperated into society. Foucault predicted that universities will become increasingly important politically, because they multiply and reinforce the power-effects of an expanding stratum
of intellectuals and, not least, as a result of new global demands for active, multi-skilled and
self-regulated citizens. (2006, p. 184)

Where ideally the university would be a site wherein “visionary insights” (as Halberstam
would have it) would be supported and encouraged, functionally, universities are far
more likely to enforce, reproduce, and collude with those same exclusionary and inclusionary binaries that, as Deacon notes, the universities themselves are founded upon.
Celebrated Black Feminist theorist bell hooks illustrates one such process as she recalls
her graduate school experience in Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom:
Nonconformity on [the part of marginal groups] was viewed with suspicion, as empty gestures of defiance aimed at masking inferiority or substandard work. In those days, those of us
from marginal groups who were allowed to enter prestigious, predominantly white colleges were
made to feel that we were not there to learn but to prove that we were the equal of whites. We
were there to prove this by showing how well we could become clones of our peers. (1994, p. 5)

Here, the institution of white supremacy joins forces with that of the university to police the kinds of knowledge that it was possible for hooks and her cohort to produce.
Within this formulation, hooks’ presumed inferiority as a Black woman categorized any
attempt to break from standard procedures of knowledge production as failure rather
than difference or even innovation. As hooks’ anecdote shows, institutions like universities’
power cannot be separated from broader social institutions like white supremacy, heteronormativity, capitalism, (&c &c &c). In fact, most hegemonic institutions rely heavily
on one another for reinforcement and legitimacy. hooks’ example shows the ways in
which white supremacy functioned to police the boundaries of acceptable knowledge
production within her university. In her book The Argonauts (2016), Maggie Nelson identifies a similar moment in her discussion of famed gender theorist Judith Butler’s work:
16

[Quoting Butler:] “It’s painful for me that I wrote a book [Gender Trouble, 1990] calling into question
identity politics, only then to be constituted as a token of lesbian identity. Either people didn’t really read the book,
or the commodification of identity politics is so strong that whatever you write, even when it’s explicitly opposed to
that politics, gets taken up by that machinery.”
I think Butler is generous to name the diffuse “commodification of identity” as the problem.
Less generously, I’d say that the simple fact that she’s a lesbian is so blinding for some, that whatever comes out of her mouth—whatever words come out of the lesbian’s mouth, whatever ideas
spout from her head, certain listeners hear only one thing: lesbian, lesbian, lesbian. It’s a quick step
from there to discounting the lesbian—or, for that matter, anyone who refuses to slip quietly
into a ‘postracial’ future that resembles all too closely the racist past and present—as identitarian,
when it’s actually the listener who cannot get beyond the identity that he has imputed to the
speaker. Calling the speaker identitarian then serves as an efficient excuse not to listen to her, in
which case the listener can resume his role as speaker. And then we can scamper off to yet another conference with a keynote by Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Slavoj Zizek… and shame
the unsophisticated identitarians, at the feet of yet another great white man pontificating from
the podium, just as we’ve done for centuries. (p. 53-4)

Just like hooks, Butler found that her intellectual nonconformity—in this case a challenge to the status quo of identity politics—caused the machinery of academic hegemony to call for reinforcement: its sibling institution, heteronormativity. As Butler frustratingly discovered, challenging the basis or validity of hegemonic institutions caused
those institutions to double down in their own defense. In this case, the machinery of
heteronormativity operated impeccably: even as Butler challenged the validity of the
category of “lesbian,” the force of that label boomeranged back at her. As Nelson so
efficiently explains, the force of the label, embedded deeply in a hierarchy that privileges and validates straightness, drowned out Butler’s dissenting point—leaving the
status quos of both heterosupremacy and academic legitimacy intact. This is a crucial
point: while the logic of an individual hegemonic institution or framework may be relatively simple to assail, it is the network of hegemonies that constitute a massive system
of oppression and domination. (I use the term “massive” here deliberately—as Butler’s
example illustrates, hegemonic systems maintain a powerful gravity: adaptable and capable of drawing all but the most carefully and forcefully constructed dissent into their
orbit.)
Conformity to the status quo thus becomes a paramount standard for academic success.
In addition to calling upon hegemonic social institutions to root out opposing views, this
conformity is achieved in part by enforcing distinctions between narrowly defined (and
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aptly-named) “disciplines” of knowledge.
Just as the standardized tests that the U.S. favors as a guide to intellectual advancement in high schools tend to identify people who are good at standardized exams
(as opposed to, say, intellectual visionaries), so in universities grades, exams, and
knowledge of canons identify scholars with an aptitude for maintaining and conforming to the dictates of the discipline. (Halberstam, 2011, p. 7)

Ontology: The
science or study of
being; that branch
of metaphysics
concerned with the
nature or essence
of being or existence.
Epistemology: the
theory of knowledge, especially
with regard to its
methods, validity,
and scope.

As Halberstam explains, the structures and practices of university instruction are implicitly designed to affirm the status quo of knowledge production
and organization—the “tried and true” ontologies and epistemologies
recognized by the reigning community of “experts.” (While Halberstam’s
project focuses its analysis on the reification of disciplinary knowledge, it
is relevant to note that the same processes are at work in other areas of
academic research practice—for example, how knowledge is recorded and
shared.) Following French philosopher Michel Foucault, Halberstam locates
disciplinarity as a “technique of modern power [that] depends upon and
deploys normalization, routines, convention, tradition, and regularity, [and
which] produces experts and administrative forms of governance” (2011, p.
7). (See: James C. Scott’s “administrative grid.”)
This point is key—because the ultimate goal of knowledge production
within such hegemonic institutions is not, in fact, the production of knowledge, but rather the production of these experts and administrative forms
of governance. The production of “experts” allows universities to maintain a firm hold on their credibility and legitimacy as knowledge producers
(for “experts” produce “expert knowledge,” do they not?). The production
of administrative forms of governance (for example, the governance that
compels researchers to work within disciplines) ensures a steady supply of
both knowledge producers and consumers who recognize and invest in this
legitimacy, and thus, in the interests of the institution itself. And, as noted
above, these interests are not just in producing the institutions’ own power
and prestige, but in the production of wealth as well. This comes both in the
form of the institution’s own wealth (prestige generates research funding,
application fees, alumni donations, and justifies tuition hikes, for example)
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and in the form of wealth production in general, i.e., in catering to the needs
of (largely profit-generating) employers. Deirdre O’Neill describes the problem of mainstream higher education thus:
Higher education increasingly functions to serve the needs of employers. Students
have become consumers in search of a degree whose main purpose is its use as a
bargaining tool in the marketplace and which prepares students to take up their
ideological role of conformity to the status quo in a capitalist society. (2015, p. 15)

Structured by this logic of capital, the production of knowledge becomes—
dangerously—a means, not an end. Saddled with profit-minded ulterior
motives (encompassing social, political, and monetary capital), the entire
production, and the knowledge produced, becomes suspect.
Though this may all seem to imply some supervillainous scheme, to quote
Makus, “Ideological formulations remain largely unconscious to both their
speaker and their receivers. Consequently, although rhetors may choose
what they will say, ideology theory maintains that these choices are determined within the common sense of the culture” (Makus, 1990, p. 500).
The common sense of the culture claims that knowledge should be produced
within rigorous standards. The common sense of the culture renders the
question, “Why shouldn’t the primary aim of the university be to produce
employable laborers?” in most cases, a rhetorical one.
While these processes do render knowledge produced within institutions like
universities ideologically suspect, I do not mean to imply that we ought to
reject all knowledge produced within institutions that harbor investments
other than pure truth-seeking. Indeed, that would leave us with very little
to work with. However, I also caution against an approach that would cast
the situation as a baby/bathwater one—wherein “good knowledge” may
be identified and separated from “bad knowledge.” Rather, recall that hegemonies do not operate through falsehoods (though falsehoods are, at times,
employed) so much as they do through partial and (often deeply) manipulated truths. Rather than rejecting this knowledge entirely, I instead suggest
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approaching it with caution and vigorous skepticism.
Given the rising popularity in the past half-century of “interdisciplinarity” within academic institutions (notably correlating to the development of, for example, gender and
ethnic studies departments), Halberstam suggests that the university as an institution
has reached a crossroads, one which “[offers] a choice between the university as a corporation and investment opportunity and the university as a new kind of public sphere
with a different investment in knowledge, in ideas, in thought and politics” (2011, p. 8).
They write:
This is not a bad time to experiment with disciplinary transformation on behalf of the project
of generating new forms of knowing, since the fields that were assembled over one hundred
years ago respond to new market economies and the demand for narrow expertise, as Foucault
described them, are now losing relevance and failing to respond to either real-world knowledge
projects or student interests. As the big disciplines begin to crumble like banks that have invested
in bad securities we might ask more broadly, Do we really want to shore up the ragged boundaries of our shared interests and intellectual commitments, or might we rather take this opportunity to rethink the project of learning and thinking altogether? (2011, p. 7)

Schools
Over a comparatively short period of time, modern schooling has brought countless individuals and
diverse populations to accept and tolerate steadily increasing degrees of subjection.
— Roger Deacon, “Michel Foucault on education:
a preliminary overview,” 2006, p. 183
In graduate school the classroom became a place I hated, a place where I struggled to claim and maintain
the right to be an independent thinker. The university and the classroom began to feel more like a prison,
a place of punishment and confinement rather than a place of promise and possibility.
— bell hooks, Teaching to Transgress: Education as the
Practice of Freedom, 1994, p. 4
It is a deep and insistent history that tugs the line of bell hooks’ intuition when she
describes this feeling of the classroom as a prison. As many scholars have suggested,
not only do schools function as institutions of confinement, regulation, socialization,
and policing, but their institutional history is also deeply and explicitly bound up with
that of the carcerial system. As Roger Deacon shows in his analysis of Foucault’s work
on education, in 17th century Europe, the notion of formal schooling developed as a
Protestant response to the “wastefulness” and “idleness” of the standard practice of
incarceration that was used as a response to society’s perceived ills (“from moral decrepitude through social vagabondage to political disquiet,”—that is, from a refusal of
state or church standards of morality to homelessness to dissent) (Deacon, 2006, p. 179).
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“Alongside confinement,” Deacon reports, “…schools functioned chiefly to contain disorder and neutralize dangers, and were justified in terms of their presumed capacity to
prevent ignorance, idleness, and insubordination” (2006, p. 179).
The very architecture of early schools—which, though adapted, still provide a blueprint
for many modern classrooms—reflects this objective. Dell Upton’s study of the Lancasterian model of schooling, popular in early 19th century America, explains the ideology
behind the arrangement of this classroom. The Lancasterian model promoted a discipline-focused, efficiency-minded “monitorial model” wherein the primary aim was to
facilitate the schoolmaster’s ability to surveil the greatest number of students at once,
packing as many students as possible into the space to maximize the number of students
reached while minimizing the expenses associated with both space and instruction. In
order to monitor the greatest number of students efficiently, the classroom was designed
with students seated in front-facing, parallel rows—all clearly visible from a front-andcentral monitor’s desk. As Upton writes:
Lancasterians on both sides of the Atlantic eagerly seized on monitorial instruction as a promising strategy of social order. If anything, Americans were more enthusiastic about the system’s
potential than the founder himself. Where Joseph Lancaster wrote in general terms of the moral
and religious benefits of public schooling, American educators envisioned schools as the mildest
of several related instruments for regulating the poor. (1996, p. 241-242)

These “related instruments” came in the form of a number of contemporary social institutions designed for the purpose of controlling the lower classes—or in other words,
the purpose of protecting private property. Upton continues:
… in monitorial classrooms, Philadelphia industrialist James Ronaldson told Roberts Vaux,
poor children would learn ‘not to break windows, riot on the street, break our fences, steal or
take flowers & fruit; wait at play house doors & beg checks, abuse those weaker than [them]
selves, and when [they] grow up [to] do [their] duty honestly.’ In short, public schools were one
of a kit of tools that also included, in order of increasing severity, Sunday schools, almshouses,
houses of refuge, and penitentiaries. (1996, p. 242)

Schools soon proved themselves to be particularly well-suited institutions for this purpose, and began to eclipse those others as sites of induction into the dominant social
order—primarily as the “chief socializing mechanism intermediate between the family
and the world of work” (Deacon p. 179). Why were schools—in particular—so adept
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at this purpose? As Upton succinctly puts it, “The motive was to discipline
the poor, while the strategy was to train the poor to discipline themselves.
Bricks and mortar defined the boundaries of citizenship, but boundaries
were effective only when they were inscribed within the citizen” (1996, p.
242). The “education” taking place, then, was at least as much ideological as
it was scholarly. This is a process Foucault has termed “an inclusion through
exclusion”; “… in the case of schools, individuals are only ‘excluded’ from
the rest of society in order to better embroil them in or ‘attach’ them to
relations of power and knowledge” (Deacon, 2006, p. 180). Students are
separated (from family, from community, from local context) into schools in
order to “include” them in broader, hegemonic social structures—to graph
their knowledge, and their understandings of themselves in society, onto
the “administrative grid.” Hooks once again demonstrates this process in
her recollection of the drastic pedagogical differences between Black-run,
racially segregated schools and White-run, integrated ones:
School changed utterly with racial integration. Gone was the messianic zeal
to transform our minds and beings that had characterized teachers and their
pedagogical practices in our all-black schools. Knowledge was suddenly about
information only. It had no relation to how one lived, behaved. It was no longer connected to antiracist struggle. Bussed to white schools, we soon learned
that obedience, and not a zealous will to learn, was what was expected of us.
Too much eagerness to learn was seen as a threat to white authority… Now, we
were mainly taught by white teachers whose lessons reinforced racist stereotypes.
(1994, p. 3)

hooks’ anecdote is a perfect demonstration of Deacon’s assertion that
“from a rationalized twenty-first century perspective, the overlaps and interconnections between early modern pedagogical… and penal techniques
appear strangely, even uncomfortably, intimate” (2006, p. 181). Consider
Upton’s description of the early 19th century trifecta of disciplinary institutions:
[The] penitentiary, the school, and the urban grid were singled out as the landmarks that triangulated the limits of republican space. Prisoners, schoolchildren,
and ordinary citizens pantomimed individual sovereignty articulated within the
common good on a series of carefully devised playing fields. Self-directed adult
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Prisons can
be said to be an
exception to this
statement, though
its “induction” operates—at this modern moment—with
more obvious and
deliberate coercion
than schools.

citizens exercised their circumscribed freedom in the civic grid, which came to
be interpreted in the early nineteenth century as a dynamic but neutral framework that specified no uses and emphasized no sites in advance, a landscape
that could accommodate and articulate the maximum number of disparate uses
into a transparent, all-encompassing order. The grid gently directed the flow of
republican life, like the stage markings in a theater. When citizens erred, the grid’s
boundaries hardened into the walls of the cell, which constrained, rather than
merely guided, action. In the open classrooms of the Lancasterian school, the
lines of the grid were visible in the rows of benches and the wire-marked routes
that marked out patterns of movement in and out, to and from the drafts. While
these boundaries were more restrictive than those of the civilian grid, they were
softer than those of the penitentiary, for school officials had faith that education
would mold pupils into citizens who carried their boundaries within themselves.
In the monitorial school, the articulation that Americans relied on grids and cells
to enforce the adult world was wired into the student: the student became his or
her own cell. (1996, p. 251)

This option is made
available under Title
IX, which requires
schools to combat
sex discrimination.
The policy is intended
to offer survivors of
sexual assault an
alternate recourse
to reporting to the
police, which can
often be a traumatic
experience (Know
Your IX, n/d). In
practice, however,
this policy can result
in the sweeping of
sexual assault under
the rug—thus protecting both the assailant
and the university.

then, are complicit in producing a system that coerces students’ behavioral and intellectual adherence to dominant ideology.

If anything, this process has only intensified in the intervening centuries,
with the “softer” school-grid—particularly in schools catering to impoverished students and students of color—constricting further and further to
more closely resemble the sibling institution of the prison. This process can
be seen in the myriad disciplinary policies (such as the truly heinous “zero
tolerance” policies, which make certain in-school disciplinary infractions
mandatorily referred to the police) that make up the “School-to-Prison
Pipeline.” And while elementary and high schools in majority-Black school
districts are furnished with their very own school-based police officers who
are free to arrest students for offenses such as throwing Skittles (King, 2015),
universities—which cater primarily to the middle- and upper-classes—are
free to deal internally with offenses as serious as sexual assault. In this way,
it is clear how original conceptions of the school system as a mechanism
for social control with deep ties to the carcerial system—specifically control
over already marginalized or disenfranchised citizens—continue recognizably to this day.
It is within this often hostile, high-stakes environment that such marginalized and disenfranchised students are expected to both learn and produce
knowledge. The framework and history of the traditional school institution,
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rigidly describe the acceptable relationships of those component parts. USC’s guide
states:
Unlike fiction or journalistic writing, the overall structure of academic writing is formal and
logical. It must be cohesive and possess a logically organized flow of ideas; this means that the
various parts are connected to form a unified whole. There should be narrative links between
sentences and paragraphs so the reader is able to follow your argument. (University of Southern
California Libraries)

Formal Qualities of Academic Argument
The academy tends toward a rigid structure when it comes to the formal qualities of
scholarly work. This rigidity serves a number of functions: on the surface, standardization is intended to provide an ease of navigation and digestion of what is often complex
intellectual material. Rigid codes of citation and documentation doubly ensure that
intellectual contributions are made in conversation with existing research and work to
prevent the theft of intellectual “property.” But enforcing strict formal rules has the added function of policing disciplinary boundaries—that is, policing dominant standards
of disciplinary epistemology and ontology through a rigid regulation of language. The
University of Southern California (USC) Libraries’ guide to academic writing (chosen
for both its detail and as a fair representation of the genre of university academic style
guides) states plainly: “Academic writing refers to a particular style of expression that
researchers use to define the intellectual boundaries of their disciplines and their areas
of expertise” (University of Southern California Libraries).
The structure of academic writing, beginning in grade school with the five-paragraph
essay (Introduction / Body / Body / Body / Conclusion) all the way to scientific research journals (Abstract / Introduction / Methods / Results / Discussion / Acknowledgements / Works Cited) is directly descended from Classical (read: Western) rhetorical tools. The relationships of the component contents of the writing to one another
is similarly descended from Classical tools, particularly “logic” and “rationality,” which
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While I take little issue with the notion of logically connected sentences (besides being
a bit of a yawn), it’s important to note that “logic” can be deceiving. The USC guide’s
use of the word “narrative” is particularly illuminating in this context; indeed, all narratives (like, for example, fiction and journalism) participate in a process of ordering and
linking information according to “logic.” But “logical” connections aren’t necessarily
true ones—the narrative bridges between data points need not be evidence-based to be
“logical.” My big sister, a doctor of Developmental Psychology, warns of this trap in
her Intro lessons on the difference between correlation and causation: “There’s a correlation between ice cream sales and crime rates,” she says, “and you could certainly use
logic to connect those things.”
“Sure,” I say. “The criminals are obviously celebrating their success.”
“Exactly!” she says. “Or the sugar rush drives them to crime. This is a silly example,
but still. There’s no evidence to support those explanations, even though there is a ‘logic’ to them. But there are other factors—other correlations—that can lead us to more
plausible logics, like, for example, that both ice cream sales and crime rates correlate
to temperature. I use that example to teach because it is so silly, but imagine a situation
where those ‘logical’ connections aren’t quite so far-fetched. You need reason to believe
that your logic is accurate. The logic and the direction of the causal relationship have to
be plausible in the presence of all the relevant information,” (Personal correspondence,
Stevie Schein, April 4, 2017). Furthermore, explicit logic is not necessary for the communication of relationship. It is common practice in visual art and poetry, for example,
to juxtapose pieces of linguistic and/or visual information—affording the viewer or
reader the opportunity to infer the “logic” that connects them.
USC’s guide also notes, “In academic writing, the author is expected to investigate the
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“Confidence,” it
seems, is the sole
affect welcome in
academic writing.

research problem from an authoritative point of view. You should, therefore,
state the strengths of your argument confidently.” Academic writing is far
more concerned with the question of “authority” than are more creative
modes of communication. Academic writing drives toward conclusion, and
the generation of uncertainty is considered bad practice. Estelle Barrett
writes in her article “Foucault’s ‘What is an Author’: Towards a critical discourse of practice as research,” that:
Contemporary criticism still defines author in same way, insisting on a unity of
writing that neutralises or resolves contradictions (and this applies equally to the
visual and other arts): inferior works are removed from visibility; those that contradict the main body of others are excluded; works written or made in different
style are excluded; references to the author’s death are removed … the author/
genius artist is bestowed with an aura of timeless permanence and immortality.
(2006, p. 2)

Therefore, part of what is being policed when we talk about the “boundaries of the discipline” is the location of academic debate. Academics are
welcome (and indeed encouraged!) to bicker over each other’s ideas, so long
as they do not challenge the discipline’s foundational precepts—be they ontological or epistemological. This is certainly the case at the institutional
level; it should be no surprise that it crops up at the formal level as well.
The writing process for scholarly work, then, is relatively standardized, and
while this may produce certain conveniences, it neatly sidesteps the idea that
how information may be presented is deeply related to what information may
be presented. While much is, admittedly, made clearer and easier through
the standardization of academic form, it’s worth questioning what truths
such strict adherence to a formal structure—with its emphasis on authority, unity, and the resolution of contradiction—may obscure. In employing
strict codes of language to render certain complex, disciplinary truths clear,
what is conversely made illegible by the exclusion of alternative languages?

mixed-disciplinary work The Argonauts. Nelson writes of her partner, genderqueer artist
Harry Dodge’s difficulty in making his gender legible to the public:
How to explain—“trans” may work well enough as shorthand, but the quickly developing mainstream narrative it evokes (“born in the wrong body,” necessitating an orthopedic pilgrimage
between two fixed destinations) is useless for some—but partially, or even profoundly, useful to
others? That for some, ‘transitioning’ may mean leaving one gender entirely behind, while for
others—like Harry, who is happy to identify as a butch on T[estosterone]—it doesn’t? I’m not on
my way anywhere, Harry sometimes tells inquirers. How to explain, in a culture frantic for resolution, that sometimes the shit stays messy? …How to explain that for some, or for some at some
times, this irresolution is OK—desirable, even…—whereas for others, or for others at some
times, it stays a source of conflict or grief ? How does one get across the fact that the best way
to find out how people feel about their gender or their sexuality—or anything else, really—is
to listen to what they tell you, and try to treat them accordingly, without shellacking over their
version of reality with yours? (2016, p. 52-53)

It is at the risk of such shellacking that we accept, unquestioningly, these near-compulsory formal elements as “neutral.” Nelson hits a few different points in her brief discussion of Harry’s general gender illegibility. First, that the resolution of contradiction
is not necessarily desirable, nor does it necessarily reflect “truth.” Nelson states a fact
that academia—in all its logic and order—hates to acknowledge: “sometimes the shit
stays messy.” Second, the temporal, contextual qualities of gender identity that Nelson
explains fly in the face of what Barrett termed “the author/genius artist’s… aura of
timeless permanence.” If the subject of the research is so subject to change, then the
analysis, too, must be contextual—rendering the aura of timeless permanence null and
void. Finally, Nelson says, the authority of definition—at least as far as gender identity
goes—lies with the person whose gender it is, not with any outsider, researcher, or analyst, no matter how authorial. Perhaps these points seem obvious, but Nelson’s passage
points to the ways that the form of recognized knowledge becomes metonymic for
knowledge itself; contradictions nullify ‘truth,’ since real Truth is always true (a constant
akin to Really Real Reality); and the power of definition rests with the onlooker (who
can, presumably, be more “objective”).

Maggie Nelson sideswipes this question in her outstanding, mixed-genre,
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lated by hegemonic institutions in in order to create a hierarchy of definitions that consolidates power within those institutions. From the Latin legere, “to read,” “legibility” is
defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “comprehensible, intelligible,” or “that can
be easily understood or interpreted; having a readily discernible nature or significance.”
In many ways, then, the production of legibility is a process of translation—and as in
any translation, through this process, some meaning is inevitably lost.

Legibility
Foucault’s work… offers nuanced understandings of the manifestations, functioning and effects of contemporary educational institutions and practices. Such institutions, where relations of power and knowledge come to support and link up with each other in more or less constant ways, form what Foucault
called ‘blocks of capacity–communication–power’. These ‘regulated and concerted systems’ fuse together
the human capacity to manipulate words, things and people, adjusting abilities and inculcating behaviour
via ‘regulated communications’ and ‘power processes’, and in the process structuring how teaching and
learning take place.
What distinguishes educational institutions from prisons, armies, and hospitals is that the former emphasize ‘communication’ above ‘capacity’ and ‘power.’
—Roger Deacon, “Michel Foucault on Education: A Preliminary
Theoretical Overview,” 2006, p. 183
Central to the project of hegemonic social control is the management of those symbolic
abstractions by which we metabolize, interpret, and communicate our shared world.
Indeed, given that all communication involves some level of abstraction, many have argued that that abstraction effectively becomes our shared world—meaning that the ability
to manipulate, transform, and interpret symbolic languages becomes a monumental
power.
The concept of “legibility” illustrates the ways in which the world of the symbolic—
particularly, but by no means exclusively, the symbolic world of language—is manipu30

James C. Scott’s body of work deals extensively with the concept of legibility as a tool
of state control—to contort complex, multiple, diverse local practices into that which
“can be easily understood or interpreted,” and therefore manipulated. In Seeing Like a
State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1999), Scott describes
premodern states’ transition to modernity as largely a process of producing legibility
among its subjects by reformulating complex local customs into the states’ own standardized languages:
Suddenly, processes as disparate as the creation of permanent last names, the standardization
of weights and measures, the establishment of cadastral surveys and population registers, the
invention of freehold tenure, the standardization of language and legal discourse, the design of
cities, and the organization of transportation seemed comprehensible as attempts at legibility
and simplification. In each case, officials took exceptionally complex, illegible, and local social
practices, such as land tenure customs or naming customs, and created a standard grid whereby
it could be centrally recorded and monitored. (qtd. Carson, 2011, p.3)

Local customs, knowledge, and practices were not only intricate and difficult to comprehend to state administrative institutions, but were also designed explicitly around
local—rather than state—interests. As such, the transformation of these local practices
into state terms served the dual role of simplification and subordination. Scott explains
the fraught relationship between these local practices and state-imposed standards
(which Scott refers to as an “administrative grid”):
[Local practices] could not be assimilated into an administrative grid without being either transformed or reduced to a convenient, if partly fictional, shorthand…In turn, this shorthand functioned... as not just a description, however inadequate. Backed by state power through records,
courts, and ultimately coercion, these state fictions transformed the reality they presumed to
observe, although never so thoroughly as to precisely fit the grid. (qtd. Carson, 2011, p.3)

Local practices, then, not only lose something in the process of translation to state
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terms, but potentially gain new meanings as well—constituting not only a
translation, but a transformation and abstraction. To quote Halberstam’s
paraphrase of Scott, “legibility” is “the favored technique of high modernism for sorting, organizing, and profiting from land and people and for
abstracting systems of knowledge from local knowledge practices… Legibility… is a condition of manipulation” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 9).

Local customs
and practices were,
of course, the product of human social
construction—I
use the example of
an “organic” form
to illustrate the
imposed, hierarchical, and approximate relationship
between state and
local standards, not
to imply that local
practices are any
more “natural,” or
any less socially
constructed, than
those hegemonic
state practices that
assert power over
them.

(The “grid” here serves as an instructive analogy; imagine here an organic
form —perhaps a gnarled tree branch—placed upon a sheet of graph paper in 1”x1” squares. How well can this form be described, using only the
terms of the graph paper? The shape of the branch on the paper is approximated, pixelated—into something that both does and does not retain its
original form. The branch has been simplified, reduced, and transformed
by the grid—and its new form, “legible” to the grid’s framework, comes to
stand entirely for its more complicated original shape.)
Tired of abstractions? Consider an example. In state terms, there exist only
two “legible” sexes/genders: male/female, man/woman. In state terms,
“male” always corresponds to “man,” “female,” to “woman.” Within this
formulation, transgender people, intersex people, genderqueer, agender,
genderfluid, two-spirit, and even the vaguely gender nonconforming are
illegible. But instead of expanding its terms to accommodate the broad
diversity of human variation, hegemonies (serving the state’s investment in
the nuclear family unit) either (a) absorb this diversity into its own logics, or
(b) eject them into catch-all categories of noncompliance: deviance, criminality, and insanity, to name a few.
The recent political battle over the legalization of gay marriage illustrates
the processes at work when hegemonies expand to absorb and make legible
that which they previously could not (or would not) recognize. In order to
compel the state to offer legality—and thus legitimacy—to the marriages of
same-sex couples, gay activists went about explicitly arguing that same-sex
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sexuality posed no threat to the hegemonic status quo. This process rested largely on
two arguments. The first, the logic of “we’re just like you,” is an assimilatory argument
which casts gay people as essentially nondisruptive of the state structures constructed around heterosexuality. “Love is love!” is the rallying proclamation—a deceptively
simple mantra. The subtext is that your love, that is, love defined by heteronormative,
state-approved logic, is the same as our love. The differences are just in the sexes of the
players—so superficial as to be negligible. The game remains the same: monogamous,
reproductive, nuclear love, legitimized by the state approval-mechanism of marriage.
Therefore, the argument is, essentially, that gay people are already legible, already expressible in the terms of the administrative grid. The grid itself need not be challenged.
The second argument, the “born this way,” logic, expresses itself as something of a
“Plan B,” to the first. “Born this way” concedes that, okay, perhaps gay people do disrupt the state’s organizing logic around sex and gender. What it does not disrupt is the
hierarchy imposed by this logic. “Born this way” translates to “we can’t help being gay,”
which translates to “but if we could, we would.” We cannot be faulted for immutable
traits, this logic contends, ignoring completely the question of whether those traits
should be subordinated in the first place. It’s a deeply pejorative logic that begs for an
“equality” dependent on the pity of the state. Please, sir! Take pity on us poor souls, and let us
into the grid. We promise we won’t make trouble.
The trickery of hegemonic logic is that in both formulations, the state—which created
queerness as a “problem” by investing so deeply in a staggeringly limited heteronormative “grid” in the first place—may then position itself as benevolent by absorbing
aspects of that “problem” into the very same limited terms. Granting legality to samesex marriage is no real sacrifice to the state, which, as these arguments have illustrated,
absorbs only those formulations of queerness that do not challenge the existing social
structure or its logics. If someone steals your car, it is no great gift if its GPS tracker is
gouged from the dash and returned to you.
But absorption is not the only tactic available to hegemonies to deflect challenges to
their logics. For challenges that cannot be so easily absorbed, hegemonies employ mech33

anisms of ejection—that is, it renders those challenges somehow “deviant,” and therefore dismissible. The two most popular mechanisms of ejection are pathologization
and criminalization. To continue with the example of queerness, “homosexuality” was,
until 1973, considered a mental disorder: a type of insanity. The American Psychiatric
Association only removed transgender from its list of mental disorders in 2012—and
“gender dysphoria” remains in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) to this day (Beredjick, 2012). A diagnosis of mental illness serves the dual
purpose of further stigmatizing identities and behaviors illegible to the state and improving the possibility of placing such people’s bodies under state control. Along similar
lines, the criminal justice system disproportionately targets queer people (the proportion
of LGBTQ people in prisons is twice as much as in the general population) (Murphy,
2016). This is no accident, nor, (as past DSM definitions might have you believe) a function of any inherent criminality of queer people. Rather, it is the result of the systemic
criminalization of LGBTQ lives (look to the recent proliferation of trans-exclusionary
“bathroom bills”). Classifying those who challenge the framework of the “administrative grid” as “insane” or “criminal” allows the state and other hegemonic powers to
place the burden of conformity on those bodies, rather than placing the burden on the
system to accommodate what could otherwise be classified as benign diversity.
This difference in approach—between absorption and ejection, conformity of individuals versus flexibility of administrative languages—was illustrated to me in the summer of 2013, when the Supreme Court handed down its decision to legalize same-sex
marriage in the U.S. At the time, I was working with a documentary film production
company in Washington, D.C. On the morning of the Court’s decision, I was assigned
to assist in the coverage of the demonstrations—both for and against—taking place
outside the Court. The cinematographer and I spent some time interviewing a kindly-looking middle aged lesbian whose activist credentials were staggering; she had been
diligently working toward the legalization of gay marriage for decades. She discussed, at
length, her views on activism and organizing, and gave a moving description of the love
she shared with her long-term, monogamous partner. As the interview was wrapping
up, a disruption broke out to our left. A seemingly male-bodied person, dressed in heels,
scarlet fishnets, a tutu, glitter-covered lipstick and a pair of devil’s horns atop their long,
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wavy, bleached-blonde hair, had begun breakdancing to loud pop music,
and was drawing a crowd.
“You see?” said the middle-aged woman we’d been interviewing. “People like that are the reason the rest of us can’t get our rights.”
In this way, the concept of “legibility” operates to enforce and perpetuate hegemonic structures by rendering all that falls outside those structures
somehow “illegible”: deviant, criminal, insane, or even simply ridiculous—
often many at once. Furthermore, while this discussion of legibility has focused largely on the “language” of hegemonic social frameworks, it’s important to recall that these concepts of legibility rely deeply on the policing
of language and the broader world of the symbolic, as, perhaps obviously,
primary sites where legibility is enforced. Consider recent outrage at and
ridicule of the increasing popularity of gender-neutral pronouns, such as
“ze/hir” or “they/them.” The protestations that “ze” and “hir” are “not
words,” or that a single person cannot be a “they” provide one small illustration of the ways in which the rules of language are wielded as defenders
of broader social status quos. These protestations are not concerned with
grammar so much as they are with gender; there are plenty of situations
in English where pronouns’ referents simply must be further specified. In
asserting that a person’s gender is unutterable through language, such protestors are in fact denying the legibility—and thus the legitimacy—of agender and genderqueer identities themselves. (In fact, an identical illustration
could be made using the words “agender” and “genderqueer.”)
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“We went to the
store.” Who, you
and me? You and
she? You and he
and she? You and
he and she and
me?

the Church as the seat of knowledge and promise of social uplift. Still, this
displacement should not be mistaken for a hostile takeover or a “revolution”
which valiantly overthrew existing power, as it is sometimes framed. Enlightenment ideals, while a shift away from the Church’s authority (and which
inarguably made waves in the process), were, at least initially, framed as a
continuation, rather than a contradiction, of fundamentally religious ontologies. Late 17th and early 18th century philosophers and scientists made this
clear even as they posited these exciting new “objective” frameworks; Galileo himself wrote, “As to the truth, of which mathematical demonstrations
give us the knowledge, it is the same which the Divine Wisdom knoweth”
(qtd. Potter, 2006, p. 10)—thus the “golden rectangle”: The Divine Proportion (Fig. 3).

Objectivity

I focus here
on the scientific
method as the most
well-rooted site of
“objectivity” as a
research value.
However, the analysis provided here
operates in much
the same way in
other disciplines—
particularly those,
like the social
sciences—whose
methods derive
from the scientific.

Since the Age of Enlightenment, “objectivity” has continuously occupied a
uniquely privileged space in the production of knowledge; many consider it
to be the primary standard by which we may judge knowledge to be accurate, trustworthy, and legitimate. Objectivity’s history of association with the
scientific method further entrenches this notion: if objectivity is the goal,
then science is the instrument—in many minds the sole instrument—with
which objectivity, and thus legitimate knowledge, may be achieved. However, the distinctions between ideas of “objectivity,” and the scientific method
are porous at best, often standing in for the same vague bundle of notions.
This bundle—vagueness and all—operates primarily as a gatekeeper: rooting out all that which is not objective, not scientific.
But what does it mean for knowledge to be “objective”? Against what concepts does objectivity define itself, and what knowledges are lost or gained
in subordinating or denying the legitimacy of non-“objective” approaches?
As are all theories of knowledge, the dominance of “objective” analysis is
rooted firmly in history. As the Enlightenment swept 18th century Europe,
for the first time, “Truth” was not the sole dominion of the divine. The
scientific method, and its optimistic narrative of Progress, began to displace
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At least in its early formulations, then, science did not displace the reigning
paradigm so much as it purported to provide better access to it—by using
the tools and evidences that the divine has provided through nature to discern divine truths. From such a beginning, enthusiasm for the method only
grew:
Objectivity and the principles of empiricism [were seen as] ingredients which
would lend themselves to the acquisition of knowledge and provide the grounds
for ascertaining humanity’s relentless quest for epistemological and ontological
answers. In other words, ontological essence, i.e., our very being, [now] lay squarely in the hands of science and scientific development. (Hammers and Brown,
2004, p. 86)

And it is in those hands, largely, that that “ontological essence” has remained.
So what is the “ontological essence,” the fundamental presumptions about
being and reality, that undergird ideologies of objectivity?
Elisabeth Lloyd, feminist philosopher of science, describes and analyzes a
history of philosophical thought that holds that the concept of objectivity is
not “transparent, stable, simple, and clear.” Lloyd’s analysis reveals the term
to operate primarily in four distinct, but interrelated ways:
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Of course, it is
entirely possible
that these assertions of continuity with religious
principles operated
as a concession
strategically intended to encourage
science’s absorption into the reigning
power structure.
Which, regardless
of whether this continuity was earnest
or strategic, is what
happened.

Sometimes:
1. Objective means detached, disinterested, unbiased, impersonal, invested in no particular point of view (or not having a point of view);
2. Objective means public, publically available, observable, or accessible (at least in
principle);
3. Objective means existing independently or separate from us;
4. Objective means really existing, Really Real, the way things really are. (qtd. Potter,
2006, p. 8)

The first definition concerns itself with bias, values, and investments. The
second with access and empiricism. The third and fourth rely on an ontology that allows for the possibility of both independent reality (the Really
Real) and our ability to access it—an implied opposition to subjectivity, that
is, realities that are mediated through consciousness. Feminist theorists of
many stripes, and subsequently queer theorists (who share much, ontologically speaking, with postmodern feminists) have, over the past several decades, systemically deconstructed each of these approaches to objectivity,
giving us a clearer picture of the processes that function to dictate what we
know, what it is possible to know, and how it is possible to know it.
The first of Lloyd’s parcels of “objective” definition rests on the presumption of an oppositional dichotomy between “facts” and “values.” Elizabeth
Potter explains the logic of this binary:

Fig. 3: “The Divine Proportion”

How sharp is the dichotomy between facts and values?… it seems that, if moral
and political values are taken as considerations in a scientific research project,
they must compete with evidential and other cognitive considerations for control
of the inquiry. That is, scientists use either facts or values to guide research; but
not both. At best, contextual values (moral, social, or political values and interests)
displace attention to evidence and valid reasoning; at worst, they lead scientists to
bias, wishful thinking, dogmatism, dishonesty, and totalitarianism. In these ways,
contextual values are supposed to interfere with the goal of scientific work, which
is the discovery of truth. (2006, p. 76)

This is the logic that structures arguments that science is—and must be—
“value-free” in order to be valuable, or good science: that moral and social
values essentially and inevitably disturb “objectivity,” resulting in bad sci38
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ence. However, despite ideologies of epistemic individualism (“understood by feminist
philosophers as a general picture according to which autonomous individuals can produce
knowledge,” Potter, 2006, p. 12, emphasis mine), most philosophers of science agree
that scientific knowledge is not—and cannot be—produced in a vacuum. Rather, scientific knowledge (and knowledge in general) is produced and maintained by groups and
communities of people. As such, Potter contends:
There is… consensus among feminist philosophers of science that knowledge is ‘situated.’ Because knowers must learn and produce knowledge in epistemic communities, they learn and
hold many (though not all) of the tacit as well as explicit beliefs of their communities. Knowers
also live in social communities and share many of the values and interests of these communities.
(Potter, 2006, p. 13, emphasis mine)

It is precisely these beliefs, interests, and values—implicit or explicit—that advocates
of “value-free” science seek to purge from scientific practice and practitioners. And
yet, feminist scientists and philosophers of science have shown that good science, that is,
science that aligns with recognized philosophical standards of scientific success (“empirically successful, congruent with existing theory, having broad scope, simple or elegant,
etc.”), can be conducted in ways that reject the (likely impossible) standard of “objective” disinterest and instead acknowledge or even embrace moral, social, or political
interests and values (Potter, 2006 p. 13).
As Potter stated, the “goal of scientific work… is the discovery of truth” (2006, p. 76).
But simple discovery of truth is not enough to make knowledge. For truths to be meaningful,
not to mention useful, they must be selected, sorted, and arranged. This process is similar
to the way a story makes selections, for example, by choosing only narrative details that
are relevant to the plot (Fig. 4), or how the human brain is wired to make perceptual
selections that allow us to notice and emphasize those sensory experiences that are most
relevant (for example) to our survival. In much the same way, scientists make selective
choices based on the purpose and goals of their research. Potter writes:

Figure 4: Scott McCloud, Understanding Comics, p. 12-13

… philosophers recognize that the aim of research is not just to find a lot of true statements, not
just ‘the bare accumulation of truths.’ No one is interested in a jumble of facts. The interests of
the researchers (often interacting with the interests of their funders) determine the questions to
which the research is addressed. In medicine, for example, interest in most research questions is
driven by the positive moral and social value we place on human health. The aim of a piece of
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research is to answer a question like ‘Does this gene correlate significantly with breast cancer?’
and, ultimately, ‘How can breast cancer be cured or eliminated?’ The research aims to find not
every single fact about this gene and every single fact about breast cancer, but those facts that are
relevant to the question asked. The facts must be significant. (2006, p. 78)

Potter demonstrates that not only are values and interests intrinsic to the research process, they are also essential to it. Bias is not the result of pre-held values and interests,
but rather the mismanagement or misrepresentation of evidence in service of an outcome grounded in those interests:
When a research report does not give us the significant facts, it is likely to give us a partial or
biased answer to the research question, even if each sentence in the report is true. Thus, research
should give us not just a theory of the phenomena, but an adequate theory of the phenomena,
on pain of bias and partiality… The ‘whole truth’ is ‘all the truths that bear on the answer’ or
‘a representative enough sample of such truths that the addition of the rest would not make the
answer turn out differently.’ And when research questions are motivated by contextual interests or values…
then what counts as significant truth and whole truth can only be judged in relation to these interests. (Potter, p.
78-9, emphasis mine)

And so: the values and interests of the research and researchers determine the research
question, and the facts that are “significant” to that research question can only be measured in relation to it. In other words, the kind of (necessarily value-driven) research
question one asks determines the nature and volume of evidence needed to adequately
answer that question. In many cases, this actually means that “scientific” data—that
is, data that can be measured, standardized, and compared—provides inadequate evidence; that the inclusion of more “subjective” relevant data would indeed change the
outcome.
Let’s take an example: In Feminism and Philosophy of Science, Potter examines a case study
conducted by Elizabeth Anderson regarding longitudinal studies on the effects of divorce, conducted first by traditional and then by feminist researchers. The traditional
researchers approached the research with a value structure that cast divorce in terms
of “injury,” “trauma,” and “loss”—all of which presupposed divorce as a sudden, singular, and negative life event. Conversely, the feminist researchers framed divorce as
both a loss and “opportunity for personal growth,” as well as “an extended process of
adjustment to a new set of life circumstances that could go better or worse over time”
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(Potter, 2006, p. 94). Furthermore, the feminist team approached divorce
not as the destruction of a family, but of its reorganization—as a continuing family with co-parents living in separate households. Finally, while the
clinical approach focused on standards such as financial security, children’s
behavioral problems, and physical illness, the feminist researchers included individual self-assessments, allowing individuals to operate as privileged
(though not infallible) sites of authority to assess their own well-being. Potter quotes Anderson: “It is precisely because subjective emotional responses
and emotion-laden interpretations are normatively relevant to judgments
of well-being that [including such subjective measures made the feminists’]
research more fruitful than research programs that focus only on objective
measures,” like financial security and children’s behavior (2006, p. 96).
Using traditional measures uncovered interesting facts about the negative outcomes of divorce on women and children, but using subjects’ feelings and interpretations uncovered, for example, the positive outcome that 70 percent of the
women judged their personalities to have improved after divorce. (Potter, 2006,
p. 96)

While the traditional team placed disproportionate value on the marriage,
the feminist team’s significant finding could be made only because they
placed value on women’s emotional health, and turned to women themselves as one method of measuring that outcome. As such, their value set not
only affected the feminist team’s interpretive framework, but the kinds of
research questions they asked, and the kinds of evidence needed to answer
those questions.
Once it is established that values and interests cannot be separated from the
project of inquiry, the processes that structure a privileging of “objectivity”
come to look more familiar (See: Homepage). Dominant values, interests,
and ideologies—being naturalized—are far less likely to be pinpointed
as sites of potential bias than are interests and ideologies that upset the status
quo. Potter holds that it is fairly likely that a scientist’s interests and values
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This is not to say
that value-driven
science cannot be
biased or “bad.” It
is simply to say that
there is no reason
to believe that by
virtue of being
value-driven in and
of itself, an inquiry
may be defined as
“bad science.”

might be uncovered by their peers, “but this is most likely to happen when
[their] values differ from the values of the peers reviewing or participating
in his area of research,” (2006, p. 13, emphasis mine). As such, systemic
practices designed to separate “value” from “fact” in most cases function far
more to guard the dominant ethos of the disciplinary community than to
root out “bad science.”
And what treasure lives within those heavily guarded disciplinary boundaries? Those same ideologies that seek to separate “value” from “fact” derive
from a singular, dominant ontology—one which Lloyd delightfully and dramatically dubs “the ontological tyranny.”
The ontological tyranny begins with ‘the strong claim that ‘objective’ reality - the
reality converged upon through the application of objective methods - equals all
of the Really Real.’ Moreover, all of the Really Real can be known because it is
publicly accessible to those of us who use these objective methods and who are
properly detached or disinterested. (Potter, 2006, p. 9)

Silliness of terminology aside, this is—in its broadest terms—the ontological assumption that undergirds traditional scientific practice, and, to a lesser
extent, social scientific practice. As Lloyd subsequently notes, this ontology
rests on a number of dubious assumptions: that there exists a “Really Real”
reality that is completely independent of us; that “objective” knowledge of
this Reality necessitates an “objective method,” which must be characterized by detachment (lest attachment or perspective disrupt our independence from the Really Real that is the object of our study); and that not only
is this Really Real reality accessible, but it is accessible to the public (so long as
they use the same objective method).

both to the singular Really Real Reality and the singular method it posits to
access it. Potter writes:
Components of the ontological tyranny appear in philosophically popular updated forms; Lloyd dubs one of these ‘Type/Law Convergent Realism.’ This view
holds that real objectivity will result in convergence on One True Description
of reality… [and] rejects pluralism in all its many forms… roughly, epistemic
pluralism holds that Reality allows itself to be known through many categories,
non-overlapping ones as well as overlapping, conflicting ones, and the categories
we use reflect our interests and values. (Potter, 2006, p. 11)

As Potter notes, philosophies that reject the “ontological tyranny” reject
the idea that knowledge of reality requires objectivity (understood as “value-neutral” or “non-ideological”), instead embracing an epistemic pluralism that holds that “Reality” (singular or otherwise) can be accessed in
a number of disparate, and even potentially contradictory, ways (2006, p.
11). For, while far from “objective,” the scientific method is not what this
research ultimately aims to destabilize. Rather, it is those frameworks that
posit objectivity (as best enacted by the scientific method) as the singular,
compulsory standard for measuring “truth” that ultimately uphold hegemonic systems of power and oppression.

While a sprawling laundry list of philosophers have engaged deeply in the
project of questioning, challenging, or reifying these assumptions, the relevant fact here is that they are, as of yet, unprovable assumptions—not least
of all unprovable within the “objective” frameworks they purport to uphold.
Furthermore, the “tyrannical” aspect of the “ontological tyranny” refers
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sis on this distance runs the risk of creating a picture wherein academic knowledge and
lived experience are divorced from one another entirely: occluding the very real and
material ways that this alienation operates to structure and frame material realities. As
Makus writes,
Ideologies… create the lived realities of their subjects. Subjects are “constituted by the unconscious
process of ideology.” Because ideologies are embedded within social formations and within the
structures of language, they are resistant to change and thus to the introduction of alternative
perspectives. There exists a structural constraint against alternative perspectives to the degree
that they may be seen as violating the common sense of a culture. (1990, p. 500, emphasis mine)

Where the Rubber Hits the Road: Material
Harms of Hegemonic Processes
Throughout this chapter, we have explored just some of the myriad ways
that hegemonies operate within knowledge-producing and knowledge-disseminating institutions. Ideologies—by nature socially-produced systems of
thought—rely on a balance of circular logic, “commonsensical” (read:
socially mediated) interpretations of empirical phenomena, and powerful,
legitimizing institutions (like schools and universities), to disguise themselves
as natural, inevitable, and singular “facts”: effectively cementing an
interpretation of reality as the singular “Really Real,” to the exclusion of
other, perhaps equally valid, interpretations. In projecting themselves as
“objective” and “value-free,” these dominant interpretations thus strongarm other possible interpretations into justifying or legitimating themselves
within dominant logic in order to be acknowledged—neatly sidestepping the
fact that these dominant ideologies are themselves forms of discourse that
ultimately lie on shaky—that is, unprovable—ontological assumptions.
Arguments against ivory tower-ism often emphasize knowledge-producing and knowledge-maintaining institutions’ alienation from practical concerns—the lived, day-to-day realities of those outside the “tower.” And while
this alienation of knowledge certainly creates distance between the knowledge produced and the material reality of lived experience, an over-empha46

The consequences of these processes are, frankly, far too broad to adequately address
here. However, I hope to illustrate just a few ways in which the rigid policing of knowledge production affects the lived experience of the general public. First, and most directly, is the possibly obvious point that knowledge is used. Elizabeth Potter writes in
Feminism and Philosophy of Science, “In the US, the sciences are treated as the final arbiters
of knowledge about all aspects of women as biological, psychological, and social beings
because scientists are understood to be experts in these areas” (2006, p. 7). As such, Potter continues, scientists are called upon to determine social policy concerning women—
meaning that when it comes to the reliability and perspectives of scientific approaches,
the stakes can be quite high. This is not a problem if the scientific knowledge being
produced were indeed “objective” or “value-free.” However, we have seen that this is
not the case—and that social values are inevitably present not only in the process of
knowledge production, but in the process of producing knowledge producers (recall bell
hooks’ experiences in both integrated elementary schools and graduate school) (hooks,
1994). Thus, the values that have traditionally dominated research communities have
contributed to a long legacy of biased research despite their stated quest to do just the
opposite. Hammers and Brown turn to social science when they assert:
[S]ociology’s claim to examine society, that is, to stand outside society as an ‘objective observer’
is nonetheless both to deny its own ‘value-system’ that has itself been shaped by a masculinist
ideology, e.g., the exaltation of universalism, transcendence, rationality and reason, and to reaffirm these same biased and androcentric ideals. (Hammers and Brown, 2004, p. 87)

Gender bias—particularly male-centered, or “androcentric,” bias—has not only pervaded the history of research, but has damn near defined it. Hammers and Brown
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continue:

There exist, of
course, more parts
of humanity than
men and women,
but the gist of Hammers and Brown’s
statement stands.
Thus Adrienne
Rich’s famous
observation: “Objectivity is a term given
to mean men’s
subjectivity” (Rich,
1987).

Not surprisingly… men (white heterosexual men in particular) have dominated
and controlled not only science but the research process itself. One result has been
the use of only male subjects such that the ‘male experience’ has been (until quite
recently) the standard or norm, which in turn has been used to represent the other
half of humanity, i.e., women (Hammers and Brown, 2004, p. 88).

Scientific research that has been conducted—by overwhelming majority—
by men and about men, shockingly does not always map onto women, trans*,
and nonbinary people. To take a medical example, this means that men—
particularly white, cisgender men—are treated with medical processes, interpretations, and procedures that have been developed with their specific
bodies in mind. While this knowledge surely does map onto other bodies to
some extent, the gaps and dissonances where it does not can cause serious
disruptions in medical care, resulting in substandard treatment, and even, in
extreme cases, death.
Just this year a study was published that claimed to have discovered that
menstrual pain can be “almost as bad as a heart attack.” Aside from the resounding, “Duh,” uttered by menstruators around the world, such a study illustrates the dissonance in medical knowledge caused by androcentric practices; while it’s estimated that 20% of women have dysmenhorrea (severe
period pain), it can take an average of 10 years to get a diagnosis. Not that a
diagnosis will do you much good—very little research has been conducted
into causes and possible treatments for the condition. Researcher Richard
Legro, M.D., of Penn State College of Medicine stated, “I’ve applied [for
funding to study severe menstrual pain] three or four times, but it always
gets rejected. I think the bottom line is that nobody thinks menstrual cramps
[are] an important public health issue” (Goldhill, 2016).
“Not an important public health issue.” This of a condition, which, again,
affects roughly 10% of the total population—the same proportion of the
population as, for example, the left-handed. I imagine if, for three days a
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month, every left-handed person were doubled over in heart-attack-level agony, it would in fact be considered an important public health issue. Then
again, there are far more white, cisgender male lefties than there are white,
cisgender male menstruators.
“Now, now,” you are possibly thinking. “Is that really a fair assessment? Sure,
this situation could be the function of androcentric bias, or even, as you seem
to be implying, villainous patriarchal malice. But there are other factors at
play! Pain is a notoriously difficult variable to measure, which makes the
study of pain conditions a tricky thing to do!”
Yes, dear Rhetorical Device, but that is precisely my point. While social
factors have historically conspired to exclude women (and trans* people,
and the otherwise gender nonconforming) from both the medical profession and subject test pools, it is not simply the absence or presence of those
marginalized by sex/gender factors that maintains the system of their marginalization. Through the construction, reification, dominance, and naturalization of the “ontological tyranny”—with its singular methodology and
its singular Reality—only certain kinds of evidence may be said to have true
access to the Really Real Reality. Therefore, that which is not measurable,
quantifiable, and comparable carries little clout within dominant discourses
of knowledge. And menstrual pain, while eminently communicable, does not
fit that standard.
I walked out of a lecture on chronic pain after too many repetitions of the phrase,
‘We have reason to believe that you are in pain, even if there is no physical evidence of your pain.’ I had not realized that the fact that I believed myself to be in
pain was not reason enough. (Biss, 2005, p. 21)

This is just one of many, many examples of how knowledge produced by
dominant, “value-free” frameworks and methodologies can produce deeply
biased—and painful—results. Of course, it is not just physical discomfort, or
even medical neglect, that results from these hegemonic approaches. In fact,
this is a relatively low-stakes example considering these processes’ history.
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For an exquisitely researched
literary essay on the
subject, I recommend Eula Biss’s
“The Pain Scale.”
A relevant excerpt:
“The four vital signs
used to determine
the health of a
patient are blood
pressure, temperature, breath, and
pulse. Recently, it
has been suggested that pain be
considered a fifth
vital sign. But pain
presents a unique
problem in terms of
measurement, and
a unique cruelty in
terms of suffering—it is entirely
subjective” (Biss,
2005).

Beginning in the Enlightenment, scientists scrambled to find “scientific” justifications
for racial subjugation—including slavery. One part of this “scientific” endeavor was
the creation of “human zoos”—the last of which closed as recently as the 1950s. These
“zoos” were intended to give Western audiences voyeuristic access to “primitive” cultures, and encouraged—as did their “scientist” contemporaries—the interpretation of
physiological diversity as evidence of racial hierarchy. The most famous example is
that of Saartjie Baartman (nicknamed “The Hottentot Venus”), a Black South African
woman who was put on display in Europe in the early 1800s to exhibit her “extremely
protuberant buttox” and “elongated labia,” which apparently (and gut-turningly) gave
audiences quite the thrill. A contemporary scientist quoted in the exhibition material
compared her labia to that of a mandrill—a monkey. (I hope I need not detail here the
horrifying related history of comparing Black people to monkeys and primates). In an
interview with BBC news, Nanette Snoep, curator of a recent Paris exhibit exposing the
links between such “human zoos” and modern-day conceptions of race, said, “Baartman marks the start of the period of description, measurement and classification, which
soon leads us to hierarchisation - the idea that there are lesser and greater races,” (Schofield, 2011). Clearly, the consequences of hegemonically produced knowledge are far
from benign.
In addition to producing the conditions that allow white supremacy to take root and
thrive, hegemonic approaches to knowledge production also contribute to its (and other
systems of oppression’s) maintenance and general upkeep. Recalling bell hooks’ experience in graduate school, in which nonconformity of thinking was ascribed to “empty
gestures of defiance aimed at masking inferiority or substandard work” (1994, p. 5), it
comes as little surprise that such repression—particularly of intellectual contributions
of women of color—has structured the development of what Patricia Hill Collins terms
“Black women’s intellectual tradition.” In her seminal work on the subject, Black Feminist
Thought, Collins writes:
Taken together, the supposedly seamless web of economy, polity, and ideology function as a highly effective system of social control designed to keep African American women in an assigned,
subordinate place. This larger system of oppression works to suppress the ideas of Black women
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intellectuals and to protect elite White male interests and worldviews. Denying African-American women the credentials to become literate certainly excluded most
African-American women from positions as scholars, teachers, authors, poets,
and critics. Moreover, while Black women historians, writers, and social scientists
have long existed, until recently these women have not held leadership positions at
universities, professional associations, publishing concerns, broadcast media, and
other social institutions of knowledge validation. Black women’s exclusion from
positions of power within mainstream institutions has led to the elevation of elite
White male ideas and interests and the corresponding suppression of Black women’s ideas and interests in traditional scholarship. (Collins, 1990, p. 7)

It is by this process—inter-reliant structures of oppression working seamlessly in concert—that marginalized knowledges are systemically discredited
and repressed. As Halberstam writes,
The social worlds we inhabit, after all, are not inevitable; they were not always
bound to turn out this way, and what’s more, in the process of producing this
reality, many other realities, fields of knowledge, and ways of being have been
discarded and, to cite Foucault again, ‘disqualified.’ (2011, p. 9)

It is precisely because the social worlds we inhabit are “not inevitable” that
hegemonies work so hard to make them appear to be so—to “disqualify”
and “discard” alternatives, like the Black intellectual tradition that Collins
identifies. These alternative sites of knowledge are, therefore, discarded not
because of their illegitimacy, but because they are too easily legitimated; as
such, they pose a threat to the dominant order that must be systemically
neutralized. Collins continues:
As an historically oppressed group, U.S. Black women have produced social
thought designed to oppose oppression. Not only does the form assumed by this
thought diverge from standard academic theory—it can take form of poetry, music, essays, and the like—but the purpose of Black women’s collective thought is
distinctly different. Social theories emerging from and/or on behalf of U.S. Black
women and other historically oppressed groups aim to find ways to escape from,
survive in, and/or oppose prevailing social and economic injustice. (1990, p. 11)

Because hegemonic ideology poses itself as “natural,” “objective,” and
“value-free,” it is easy to posit the kinds of knowledge that Collins identifies as “ideologically driven,” and therefore to dismiss its legitimacy on the
basis of bias. Such is hegemony’s “partial, manipulated truth.” In fact, the
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knowledge Collins identifies is ideologically driven—but what’s disguised is the ideology
that it is driving against. The result is that challenges to the status quo may be cast as
“political,” and thus “biased,” allowing them to be dismissed, ignored, and neutralized.
In this way, hegemonic ideologies’ invisibility allows them to obstruct one possible pathway toward the remediation of an oppressive racial framework that systemically denies
Black people (among others) access to education, housing, financial security, physical
safety, and freedom (to name a few). The ivory tower of academia may be out of touch
with the practical, lived realities of day-to-day people, but we must be careful to remember that that is not by accident—and it does not reduce its impact on them.

Chapter Summation
We have seen the powerful, often invisible ways that hegemonic ideologies infiltrate,
overtake, and restructure local knowledge communities to suit the interests of those in
power. We have seen the ways in which these hegemonies have formed the very foundations of our knowledge-making and knowledge-disseminating structures. We have seen
the ways in which the policing of disciplines, of language, of legibility, and of legitimacy protect and propagate these ideologies, and we have seen just a small sample of the
systemic oppressions and the real, material harm that these ideologies can cause.
These issues are global, entrenched, and poisonous. While I do not propose that any
approach or set of approaches to art education constitutes an “answer” to these problems, I do think that it is worthwhile to consider what it is we, as art educators and arts
based researchers, can do to respond to the effects of these systems. I do not intend to
map out a transformative curriculum or radical pedagogy. Rather, in Chapter 2, I hope
to outline one possible approach to art and art education that might provide insight into
the strategic position the arts hold in relation to such systems, and how that position
might be leveraged toward explicitly counterhegemonic aims.
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Chapter 2
Queer Theory and Arts-Based Research:
A Partnership
… perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was
always already gender. Queer does not ignore or view as irrelevant these categories, but simultaneously
questions them and demands their contextualization and historicization. For queer theorists then, identity
is both unstable and multiple.
—Corie Hammers and Alan D. Brown III, “Towards a feminist-queer alliance:
a paradigmatic shift in the research process, p. 95
[An] arts-based ontology accepts a universe of variances and supports knowledge that presents itself
as a local interpretation of reality, valid within its own context, yet fully subject to reinterpretation or
translation into other contexts.
— James Haywood Rolling Jr., Arts-Based Research: A Primer, p. 5
In this chapter, I will propose and describe the possible advantages of using a dual
framework of queer theory and arts based research as one site of “answer” to the web
of interrelated systems that perpetuate the hegemonic formulations of knowledge production outlined in Chapter 1. This is by no means an exclusive proposition—in fact, it
is intended to be taken as just one example of a formulation that engages the strengths
of several alternate frameworks to build a hardier, more potent body of counterhegemonic knowledge than either would build alone. Queer theory and arts based research
have a lot in common—not just in their strengths and aims, but also in that each har53

bors its own specific sites of weakness when to comes to levying a structural critique. It
is my contention that in thoughtfully joining these approaches, each can come to caulk
the other’s cracks: resulting in a strategic, critical, systemic practice from which to build,
teach, and refine an approach to knowledge making that actively and effectively dissents
to the harms perpetrated by hegemonic knowledge.

Definitions: Queer
Though it’s held a long list of denotations in the six centuries it’s been in use,
today, the word queer is used primarily in three ways:
1. An umbrella term for sexes, genders, and sexualities that fall outside of the heteronormative framework—a single-syllable shorthand
for “LGBTQ.” Along similar lines, “queer” is used as a deliberately
nonspecific term for those who fall into that galaxy of identity, but
prefer—for any number of perfectly legitimate reasons—to specify
no further.
2. A derogatory term for the above; a slur. Between the two, which
definition is in use has a lot to do with who is speaking.

This is not to say
that the experience
of oppression in
relationship to
these categories is
necessarily similar;
and indeed, I urge
anyone attempting
to compare these
categories to exercise caution and
restraint.

3. A politics derived from critical theory—specifically “queer theory”—situated within a framework of postmodernism. Taking questions of gender, sex, and sexuality as its starting point, queer theory
was developed primarily within the academy as an approach whose
purpose is to challenge and decenter hegemonic thinking in any location.Queer theory therefore recognizes that the processes that create and enforce categories of sex, gender, and sexuality are awfully
similar to those that create and enforce categories of race, nation,
ability, sanity, &c. &c. &c.
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The third definition is the most salient for the purposes of this thesis. Since it is often
the definition that is least familiar to those who encounter it, it is worthwhile to take a
moment here to describe the theory. To start, Jennifer Purvis offers this definition in an
essay on the place of queer theory within Women’s and Gender Studies departments:
Queer = twisting, making strange: a noun, a verb, an adjective. Once a weapon in the arsenal of
hate speech against so-called gender and sexual deviants, this term now serves as a powerful
source of political energy. It signifies not only a range of variant genders and non-(heterosexual)
normative sexualities but a posture of resistance, a questioning attitude, and a set of techniques
and approaches. It calls upon us to think beyond what may be known, seen, ascertained, pinned
down, disciplined, institutionalized, and controlled. It positions us to move toward new horizons. (2011, p. 189)

Situated in this manner, it’s clear that queer theory challenges traditional approaches
to academia. Purvis goes on to write, “Queer approaches target discursive regimes that
perpetually and unjustly parcel out inclusion, privilege, legitimacy, and human value”
(2011, p. 199). As we saw in Chapter 1 (“The Academy”), these are precisely the functions that the academy takes on in the process of the production of knowledge. As such,
queer theory explicitly opposes these functions, holding that the categories, taxonomies,
and disciplinary boundaries that the academy upholds are not only inaccurate, but also
oppressive.
[Queer] speaks through those of us who highlight the problems associated with dominant understandings of sex, sexuality, and gender and those of us who promote unsettling critical practices and textual strategies and a general awareness of the instability of categories, subjects, and
ordering principles (even disciplines themselves). This articulation of queer overlaps with other
critical perspectives, such as those that aim to dismantle dominant constructions of race, class,
national identity, and ability, and represents the most politically effective resonance of queer.
(Purvis, 2011, p. 193)

In this way, by questioning and challenging the stability of the principles which structure our intellectual and social worlds, queer theory looks to the cracks in hegemonic
logics not just to make them visible, but also to point out where to place its chisel. Queer
theory thus acknowledges the inconsistencies and instabilities of hegemonic logic not
only to highlight alternate modes of accessing “truth” and “knowledge”, but also to ask,
“What sorts of worlds might be built on these alternate knowledges?”
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Queer breaks down these boundaries, these differences. By refusing to pigeonhole our sexuality
and gender we are also refusing to be branded. It is a statement of rejection of being assimilated
after ‘coming out’ and it rejects being branded at all. Some make a big fuss about how Queer is
indefinable, but this is part of the point, and part of what makes it so good.
Many say the now slightly clichéd line ‘I’m not gay as in happy, I’m Queer as in fuck you!’ but
that in a sense captures the heart of it. Queer is not about being happy with the current set-up,
it’s not about being happy about being assimilated into a heterosexist capitalist culture, it’s about
being angry (because we do still have a lot to be angry about), it’s about being radical, and it’s
about fighting for liberation. (Bailey, 2010)
.

Queer, then, is in large part a politics of opposition: of refusal. It refuses the notion that
the worlds we live in—discursive, material, and everywhere between—are the only ones
possible. It seeks to undermine the stability of the categories upon which our dominant
narratives rest in order to unearth the possibilities that lie outside them: to show that
even in a world of zeroes and ones, there are infinite, unstated possibilities between, and
infinite combinations, iterations, and conceptions thereof. Hammers and Brown write:
Herein lies the importance of a feminist–queer approach to the social sciences: difference and
the constant questioning of socially constructed concepts, which act as filters in our perception
of society, has the potential to enlighten us to possibilities. In other words, to assert multiple
identities and their fluidity in which humans leave themselves open to change and re-negotiation
is, in the truest sense of the word, liberating. ‘Queering’ also conveys an active, energetic and
self-critical stance that moves with its subject; that is, the constant movement of borders, locations and societal shifts and transitions. (2004, p. 96)

So while queer is a politics of opposition, it can also be thought of as a politics of affirmation: affirmation of those modes of being and knowing that the “administrative
grid” renders invisible, impossible, and illegible.

Definitions: Arts Based Research
Unlike queer theory, arts based research is, essentially, just what it sounds. It
is an approach to research and scholarship founded on the notion that the
practices and forms employed by the arts can be sites of meaningful knowledge making of equal value to more traditional approaches. This can take
the form of process, product, or both: an artist could use painting to report
findings on research conducted through traditional methods, or they could
use the act of painting as the research itself, and present the finished work
as research product. They could, alternately, conduct the research through
the act of painting and write an analysis or reflection on what has been discovered. Each of these approaches, if done thoughtfully and well, has the
potential to produce valid and valuable knowledge. Further, it is precisely in
its divergence from traditional approaches to research that its value is most
clear. James Haywood Rolling Jr. writes in Arts-Based Research: A Primer:
[Arts-based research] is a domain governed by beliefs, values, laws, and practices
different from the sciences, allowing a different character of research investigation that includes aesthetic ‘power and elegance, creativity, openness… independence… the [researcher’s] emotional and intellectual commitment to the case itself, social courage, and egalitarianism.’ (Rolling, 2013, p. 5)

In Arts Based Research, Barone and Eisner expand further on the arts’ ability
to bring forth new meanings and knowledges, which may complement or
contradict those produced by traditional practices:
The idea that research can be conducted using nondiscursive means such as pictures, or music, or dance, or all of those in combination, is not an idea that is
widely practiced in American research centers or in American schools. We tend
to think about research as being formulated exclusively—and of necessity—in
words, the more literal, the better. The idea that research reports and sections
thereof can be crafted in a way not dissimilar from the way in which great novelists
write and great painters paint is even rarer. Thus, the idea that we advance is that
matters of meaning are shaped—that is, enhanced and constrained—by the tools
we use. When those tools limit what is expressible or representational, a certain
price is paid for the neglect of what has been omitted. (2011, p. 1-2)
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While the methods of evaluating
the quality of arts
based research are
beyond the scope of
this paper, Barone
& Eisner (2011)
and Rolling (2013)
offer instructive
guidelines toward
this end.

These limited “tools” of which Barone and Eisner write are the same tools identified
in Chapter 1 as those favored by traditional approaches to scholarship (e.g. “Legibility,” “Objectivity,” “Formal Qualities of Academic Argument,”). As we have seen, the
boundaries imposed by those tools confirm Barone and Eisner’s (rather mild) assertion
that these approaches impose limits on what may be known and exact a “price.” In this
way, proponents position arts based research both as a means of widening the scope of
knowledge making to incorporate knowledges inaccessible by traditional approaches, as
well as asserting the possibility that such a widening might help to remediate some of
the harm those approaches have caused.

Arts-Based Research as Counterhegemonic
Knowledge Practice
The inclusion of expressly political standpoints in scholarly work is, as we’ve seen, a
controversial proposition—begging the question of whether such scholarship meets the
academy’s standards for “objectivity.” Viewed in this light, the inclusion of expressly political standpoints in artworks that aim to be viewed as scholarship become doubly suspect. In their book, Arts Based Research, Tom Barone and Eliot Eisner address this point:
To suggest that the political can or should play a role in any form of social research remains, for
some research traditionalists, a call to argument. Since its inception and throughout most of its
history, social research has been identified exclusively as a kind of apolitical science, one meant
to serve not as a form of advocacy, but as a neutral, objective adjudicator of the competing values undergirding various positions taken on social issues.
A detachment from the political has, likewise, been a hallmark of several schools of aesthetics.
The search for the ‘beautiful’ within art has been undertaken in a supposedly transcendent
realm, one therefore unsullied by the power relationships that reside within the affairs of daily
commerce. It is not surprising, then, that some commentators would assume that any form of
social research that honors the premises, principles, and protocols of the arts must be twice removed from the realm of the political. (Barone and Eisner, 2011, p. 121)

The point Barone and Eisner are getting at is that the arts stand on swampy ground
when it comes to mainstream acceptance of their capacity to produce knowledge, particularly when it comes to knowledge with a political perspective. With regard to nearly
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every standard of “legitimacy,” the arts are an easy target; they are patently mediated
through subjectivity (non-objective), open to interpretation (unfixed in meaning), difficult to interpret (illegible), and completely unable to be measured (non-scientific). These
qualities render the perceived relationship between the arts and “academic,” “scholarly,” (“rigorous,” “serious,” legitimate,”) knowledge a tenuous one. The United States’
“slash and burn” approach to public arts education funding is one way this strained
relationship is expressed: if the boat’s too heavy (or rather, too expensive), art is the first
cargo to be dumped. However, as we saw in Chapter 1, not only is each of these evaluative standards gravely flawed, but they are also imbricated in systems of power and
oppression that are far more invested in the maintenance of power than of the creation
and expansion of human understanding. It is by positioning hegemonic ideologies as
“non-ideological” or “value-neutral” that the expression of dissenting ideologies may
be cast as “biased.” As Barone and Eisner continue, “We hold with many other theorists
that power relations are evident in all human activities and artifacts, including artistic
ones, although some more obviously than others. Arts based social research is, therefore, inherently political,” (Barone and Eisner, 2011, p. 121).

Arts as Liberation: “Wishful Claptrap”?
While dominant narratives surrounding the purpose and value of the arts largely exclude the possibility of knowledge making, paradoxically, there is a persistent narrative that affirms the possibility—and in extreme cases, the inevitability—of the arts as
a practice of political liberation. In an article titled “Why Authoritarians Attack the
Arts,” The New York Times’ Eve Ewing writes:
[A]s Hitler understood, artists play a distinctive role in challenging authoritarianism. Art creates
pathways for subversion, for political understanding and solidarity among coalition builders.
Art teaches us that lives other than our own have value. Like the proverbial court jester who
can openly mock the king in his own court, artists who occupy marginalized social positions
can use their art to challenge structures of power in ways that would otherwise be dangerous or
impossible. (Ewing, 2017)
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Such a formulation certainly offers plausible reason for why—within hegemonic frameworks—dominant institutions have been so dismissive of arts
based knowledge; in neutralizing its claim to knowledge, such institutions
may neutralize its challenge to power. Barone and Eisner suggest as much in
Arts Based Research:
One important attribute of works of art, and arts based research, can be their
capacity for enhancing alternative meanings that adhere to social phenomena,
thereby undercutting the authority of the master narrative. This may make art
appear inconvenient or even dangerous to those who have become familiar and
comfortable with the prevailing, dominant, exclusive worldview legitimated within
the metanarrative that a work of art or arts based research may serve to question.
Those with interests in the maintenance of that narrative may, in various ways,
attempt to dismiss or even banish transgressive works of art. (2011, p. 124)

There certainly exists historical evidence to support this claim. Ewing’s article cites a number of instances of authoritarian responses to dissenting
artists: from the predictable examples of censorship and persecution under
Hitler and Stalin to the arrest, torture and exile of Chilean muralists under Pinochet. She cites the Trump administration’s proposed elimination of
the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)—a federal grantmaking body
that has funded such projects, as Ewing notes, as “a dance performance
by people in wheelchairs,” a chorus concert designed for Minnesota public
schools “highlighting the experiences of LGBTQ youth,” and workshops
led by Muslim artists in a range of contemporary media. “Queer people,
immigrants, and minorities have long used art as a means of dismantling the
institutions that would silence us first and kill us later, and the NEA is one
of the few wide-reaching institutions that support that work,” Ewing writes
(2017).
This claim—that marginalized artists use their craft to dismantle oppressive institutions—is difficult to substantiate. While I do not argue that queer
people, immigrants, and “minorities” have often employed the arts as a political tool and as an outlet for their outrage, even making such production
a crucial element of broader campaigns for liberation, I do wonder: where,
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exactly, might I find the strewn wreckage of these dismantled institutions?
What I aim to capture here is the degree to which well-meaning narratives of the arts’
revolutionary potential all too often collapse the distinction between what the arts can
do and what they do do. Philosopher Elaine Scarrey performs an extreme case of this
collapse in her 1999 treatise, On Beauty and Being Just. Scarrey argues that there exists an
intrinsic link between the impulse toward beauty and the impulse toward justice: that
the experience of beauty ignites the urge to protect it, to act on its behalf. In The Art
of Cruelty, Maggie Nelson responds to Scarrey by invoking performance artist Maria
Abramovic’s Rhythm 0, a piece in which the artist stood for six hours and invited the audience to act upon her body using any of 72 tools placed on a table beside her, including
a loaded gun (Fig. 5).
While audiences were initially gentle, over the course of the piece, Abramovic’s clothes
were cut from her body, thorns pushed into her stomach, her neck cut, her blood sucked,
and a fight broke out when an audience member placed the gun in Abramovic’s hand
and attempted to wrap her finger around the trigger. Nelson writes:
In six short hours, Rhythm 0 razes [Scarrey’s proposition] to the ground, and reveals it to be the
wishful claptrap that it is… Scarrey is right that we often feel the urge to protect and worship
beautiful things or people. But it is dangerous folly to ignore the fact that often we also feel the
urge to injure or destroy them. With ethics, as with psychology, you cannot just lop off the negative or contradictory impulses and hope for the best. (Nelson, 2011, p. 77)

Nelson’s point is that art—like Abramovic’s 72 items—is a tool that can be used in
equal measure for good or ill. So while the arts certainly have liberatory potential, there
is nothing inherently radical, revolutionary, or transgressive about the practice of artmaking, as some romantic narratives imply. In her effort to illustrate dictatorships’ hostility toward artistic endeavors, Ewing fails to give weight to the flip side of the coin: the
fact that each of these dictators supported—or even employed—artists whose messages
affirmed their regimes. (And we cannot forget: Hitler himself was a painter!) Thus,
however seductive, the narrative of the arts as a site of liberation is an incomplete one,
disguising the fact that the arts can collude with power just as easily as they can challenge it. Furthermore, it is my suspicion that such a narrative does more to neuter the
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arts’ potential for ideological upset than to buttress it. For if the mere act of artmaking
is cast as a challenge to the system—even if we specify artmaking with explicitly political content—artists are relieved of the responsibility to critically evaluate the impact
of their work, or to pursue their ostensible political aims through other channels. This
process affords artists and audiences alike the convenient ability to position themselves
as political, caring, justice-seekers while leaving the structural frameworks such artworks
claim to challenge resoundingly intact.
Nowhere are these processes more obviously at play at this cultural moment than in
the smash-hit Broadway musical Hamilton. Written by and starring affable, charismatic
Puerto Rican-American artist Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton filters the story of the
United States’ foundation through a hip-hop lens, creating what has been called a
“groundbreaking” rap-based musical. Furthermore, Hamilton’s cast of characters (depicting America’s all-white founding fathers) is composed entirely of Black, Asian, and
Latinx actors. It’s difficult to overstate the cultural and media hype that Hamilton has
received. Ben Brantley’s comment in his New York Times review could be taken as a representative sample: “I am loath to tell people to mortgage their houses and lease their
children to acquire tickets to a hit Broadway show, but Hamilton… might just be worth
it,” (Brantley, 2015). TechInsider ran a review titled “Hamilton is the most important
musical of our time,” and the Chicago Tribune called it “astonishing,” “sublime,” and
“the cultural event of our time,” (qtd. Nichols, 2016). In 2016, the year the musical
premiered, it netted Miranda a Pulitzer Prize and a MacArthur Genius Grant.

Figure 5: “Rhythm 0,” Maria Abramovic, 1974
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I admit, I understand the appeal. Miranda seems to be doing a good thing: depicting
the founding of our country using the bodies of those who have been historically and
systemically excluded from its grand promises, creating not just a show—but a megahit—
that will inevitably provide a worthy site of employment for its large cast of (near-exclusively) actors of color, and remind its audience that all America’s history can be
cast, in one way or another, as an “immigrant narrative.” Hell, even I can’t argue that
Miranda’s work has people thinking about the value of creative approaches to historical
knowledge-making.
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This appeal, however, is precisely what makes Hamilton so dangerous. As Alex Nichols
writes in his 2016 Current Affairs article, “You Should Be Terrified That People Who Like
‘Hamilton’ Run Our Country”:
Changing the races allows [the founding fathers] to appear far more sympathetic than they
would otherwise be. Hamilton creator Lin-Manuel Miranda says he did this intentionally, to make
the cast “look like America today,” and that having black actors play the roles “allow[s] you to
leave whatever cultural baggage you have about the founding fathers at the door.” (“Cultural
baggage” is an odd way of describing “feeling discomfort at warm portrayals of slaveowners.”)
Thus Hamilton’s superficial diversity lets its almost entirely white audience feel good about watching it: no guilt for seeing dead white men in a positive light required. (Nichols, 2016)

(Nichols adds that, “Indeed, [the portrayal of Thomas Jefferson as a ‘Dirty South
trap-rapper’] does take some getting used to, because the actual Thomas Jefferson raped
slaves,” (2016)). As Nichols goes on to note, the re-writing of history through bodies of
color neatly belies the fact that they do not need to be re-written into history: people of
color were there. And yet, not a single character in the play depicts a historical person
of color. Not a freeman, not a slave. Not one. And though it’s given a cursory nod or two
in the libretto, the widespread institution of slavery—and all its attendant horrors—is
left out of the show almost entirely. Nichols writes, “We might call it a kind of, well,
‘blackwashing,’ making something that was heinous seem somehow palatable by retroactively injecting diversity into it,” (Nichols, 2016).
While Hamilton responds to the history of exclusion that people of color have faced in
America, it does nothing to challenge—and in fact goes out of its way to avoid challenging—any of the historical or systemic reasons that this exclusion has occurred. Its brand
of “colorblind” casting best supports a neoliberal, “colorblind” approach to politics,
which claims that we’re all already equal. Race isn’t an issue in this country anymore.
Slavery was so long ago—why do we have to keep talking about it?
Even with an explicitly stated political goal, Hamilton cannot help but fall into a reaffirmation of the systemic structures it purports to address. And this, in part, accounts
for its success. Just like the campaign for the legalization of gay marriage, Hamilton is
based on an assimilatory argument that erases the historical factors that have created the oppressive conditions to which it purports to respond—and thus offers no sub64

stantive critique. Instead, Hamilton favors a rallying cry of “Kumbaya,” and demands
little-to-nothing of the state and cultural institutions that perpetuate these conditions.
While it cannot be disputed that Hamilton has succeeded as a commercial endeavor, its
failure to engage a critical, structural critique renders it a lackluster challenge to power.

Arts in Education
The context of formal arts education similarly fails to produce much potent affirmation
of the artist-as-critical-liberator narrative. Just as the hegemonic interests of the academy (which serves as a site for both the production and consumption of knowledge)
restrict the production of knowledge in traditional fields, so is the production of art
restricted by its own sites of production and consumption. Katrine Hjelde writes in her
article “Paradox and Potential: Fine Art Employability and Enterprise Perspectives” of
the “contradictory value system” that emerges as institutions of art education attempt
simultaneously to educate artists and prepare them to be “employable” in an increasingly financially unstable marketplace for fine art skill. Hjelde writes:
Despite the increase in practices that are centered on social engagement, in commercial terms
the art market is arguably moving into a direction that is not benefitting artists. The recent
publication, The New Economy of Art by Martin and Tawadros (2014), tells us that comparatively,
artists earn less now than ever before, and that there is very little value attached to artistic labour but an
often exalted sense of value attached to artists’ products. Therefore, while the art market is more buoyant
than ever, individual artists really struggle to make their work and to survive financially. In the
United Kingdom, public funding to art and artists has been cut during the course of the recent
recession… Paul Harper (2014) found that fees from making and presenting work account for 20
per cent of income for artist. Failure to do so is often perceived as a failure as an artist (both by
the artist and by society), as we struggle to articulate other systems of worth and value beyond
the monetary. (Hjelde, 2015 p. 184, emphasis mine)

Like the traditional academic, the relationship between the artist/art student, the academy, and the marketplace (which again, for the traditional academic, largely is the academy) is one characterized by tension. Just as O’Neill identified that “Higher education
increasingly functions to serve the needs of employers” (2015, p. 15), art education
increasingly functions to serve the demands of the art market. As such, the production
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of art—like the production of “traditional” knowledge—comes to be more
concerned with the generation of profit than with its own artistic, intellectual concerns. Within such a context, Hjelde writes,
… it seems pertinent to query whether a Fine Art education at degree level should
both prepare graduates for a successful career in the arts to make them entrepreneurial and employable, whilst also providing them with the critical tools to
fundamentally question their place within a neo-capitalist system that is regarded
by some as a financially and environmentally unsustainable order. (2015, p. 174)

It would, of course, seem unwise—irresponsible even—not to provide students with the practical knowledge they need to make their work and meet
their survival needs. However, to do so without simultaneously offering them
context as to how and why, exactly, such a proposition has become so difficult to maintain, and what intellectual, rhetorical, and political tools they
might employ to challenge those processes, would be folly. It would be capitulation to the hegemonic systems that maintain such a structure to leave
that structure unquestioned, or to lead students to the conclusion that such
a system is inevitable, “just the way it is,” or simply the price one pays
for pursuing the arts.
It is worth noting that with relation to the arts as a site of knowledge production, the depoliticization of the arts contributes to this process as much as
the framing of the arts as potentially too political. When the arts are framed
as apolitical—as the eccentric, if sometimes delightful, impressive, or otherwise neat—expressions of individual minds, then their value comes to be
located largely with the artist themself. As such, it is the artist’s responsibility to scrounge up the funds for their “passion projects,” which, within this
framework, offer little value to the outside world beyond a few seconds of
entertainment for museumgoers passing by at a trot. Furthermore, because
the “passion” of the project is ostensibly the motivation, monetary motivation need not be provided beyond the most basic of cost-covering. Thus the
twisted logic of capital: the enjoyment of work devalues it.
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Therefore, even as art schools may encourage their students to produce “socially engaged art,” Hjelde notes:
[T]here is little or no productive discussion in the contemporary art school about the effects
of contradictory value systems on students and the learning environment. In turn, this leads
directly to ill-defined and sometimes contradictory ways of implementing [enterprise and employability] learning and represents a missed opportunity for very productive discussions around
the issue of enterprise and employability in Fine Art.
A key challenge for those teaching Fine Art is to maintain a productive and critical dynamic
between the subject and the academy and to critically explore this dynamic within the wider
context of our present society and perhaps propositionally for the future. (2015, p. 181, 185)

In other words, in order to address the harm inflicted by powerful hegemonic institutions, that harm must be explicitly discussed, and traced back to those systems. This
does not preclude the possibility of also working within them—indeed, at this moment
in time, there are few other options (and despite what some pop-narratives would have
us believe, there’s little value in literally starving for one’s art).
This position—to criticize the academy from within the academy—may seem contradictory. Indeed, in many cases it may be a necessary contradiction. However, forging a
critical relationship to the academy is one place where queer theory can help to guide
the artist-scholar. Halberstam describes a manifesto written by Fred Moten and Stefano
Harney, which describes one mode of radical relation between scholar and academy.
Attentive readers may observe that this passage could just as easily describe the relationship between artist-scholar and the academy, or artist and the “enterprise and employability” school of fine art:
[Moten and Harney’s] essay is a searing critique directed at the intellectual and the critical
intellectual, the professional scholar and the ‘critical academic professionals.’ For Moten and
Harney, the critical academic is not the answer to encroaching professionalization but an extension of it, using the very same tools and legitimating strategies to become ‘an ally of professional
education.’ Moten and Harney prefer to pitch their tent with the ‘subversive intellectuals,’ a
maroon community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of ‘rigor,’
‘excellence,’ and ‘productivity.’ They tell us to ‘steal from the university,’ to ‘steal the enlightenment for others’; and to act against ‘what Foucault called the Conquest, the unspoken war that
founded, and with the force of law refounds, society’. And what does the under commons of the
university want to be? It wants to constitute an unprofessional force of fugitive knowers, with a
set of intellectual practices not bound by examination systems and test scores. The goal for this
unprofessionalization is not to abolish; in fact Moten and Harney set the fugitive intellectual
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against the elimination or abolition of this, the founding or refounding of that: ‘Not so much
the abolition of prisons but the abolition of a society that could have prisons, that could have
slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but
abolition as the founding of a new society.’” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 8)

This dual act of refusal (of the academy’s standards of “legitimate” knowledge production) and affirmation (of possible alternate worlds) reflects a queer approach that allows
for contradiction: for relying on the hegemonic structures that have monopolized survival, while simultaneously building up a critical mass of dissenting knowledge. Barone
and Eisner expressly affirm the ability of the arts to throw the status quo off-balance and
contribute to “the founding of a new society”:
[T]he promotion of this disequilibrium through the obviation and undercutting of a prevailing
worldview may also mean a useful sort of emancipation of readers and viewers. Nelson Goodman (1968) has written about the way in which art can “call for and then resist a usual kind of
picture” and, thereby, “bring out… neglected likenesses and differences [and] in some measure,
remake our world.’ (2011, p.16)

Of course, as we have seen, such remaking must be done carefully and deliberately.
Hammers and Brown’s language reflects that of Moten and Harney as they begin to
outline their proposed queer-feminist methodology:
One… way in which to redress the exclusion of ‘the Other’ and ‘give voice’ to those who have
been silenced and shut out is of course, not only the inclusion of marginalized groups but also
the fostering of conditions that would allow these groups to ‘speak.’ (Hammers and Brown,
2004, p. 89)

Simply placing the historically marginalized inside the academy does not redress the
structures that undergird their marginalization—in the academy or outside. Collins
writes in Black Feminist Thought that historically, Black women’s intellectual work has
been systemically excluded from the academy. And while Black women have, since the
1960s, “entered faculty positions in higher education in small but unprecedented numbers” (Collins, 1990, p. 19), the admittance of Black women has not necessarily meant
the admittance of Black Feminist thought. Collins writes:
These women confront a particular dilemma. On the one hand, acquiring the prestige enjoyed
by their colleagues often required unquestioned acceptance of academic norms. On the other
hand, many of these same norms remain wedded to notions of Black and female inferiority.
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Finding ways to temper critical responses to academia without unduly jeopardizing their careers
constitutes a new challenge for Black women who aim to be intellectuals within academia, especially intellectuals engaged in developing Black feminist thought. (1990, p. 19)

The conundrum Collins describes recalls the discussion in Chapter 1, which showed
that ideologies of dominance and oppression manifest not only within the structures of
academic institution (“The Academy”), but also within the very pages of the knowledge
those institutions produce (“Legibility,” “Objectivity,” “Formal Qualities of Academic
Argument”). In academic institutions that have vested interest in an oppressive status
quo, this means not only the exclusion of marginalized people but also the exclusion of
those people’s intellectual challenges to the harmful ideological systems that those institutions favor. And as Collins shows, rejection of arts-based knowledge as “legitimate”
knowledge is deeply bound up in the rejection of such intellectual challenges:
Musicians, vocalists, poets, writers, and other artists constitute another group from which Black
women intellectuals have emerged… Producing intellectual work is generally not attributed to
Black women artists and political activists. Especially in elite institutions of higher education,
such women are typically viewed as objects of study, a classification that creates a false dichotomy between scholarship and activism, between thinking and doing. In contrast, examining the
ideas and actions of these excluded groups in a way that views them as subjects reveals a world
in which behavior is a statement of philosophy and in which a vibrant, both/and, scholar/activist tradition remains intact. (1990, p. 20)

In other words, acknowledging artistic (and as Collins points out, activist) traditions as
legitimate sites of knowledge production widens our intellectual scope, and allows for
engagement with knowledges that aim to do more than buttress an oppressive status
quo.
“That’s all fine and good,” some readers may be thinking. “But where do we draw the
line? Where does explicitly political research cross the line into blind propaganda?”
Barone and Eisner, too, ask this question. They write:
[We reject the] fallacious assumption…that would legitimate all obviously political works of arts
based research as useful research. This fallacy states that there is—or should be—no distinction
made between art and agitprop, that arts based research may be didactic, polemical, dogmatic,
or even propagandistic. Instead, through examples and argument, we will insist that if art based
social research—like art itself—may interrogate an entrenched ideological stance regarding so-
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cial phenomena it must do so without imposing a ‘correct’ alternate ideology. Instead, good
examples of arts based research accomplish the previously identified purpose for this sort of
inquiry—the artful posing of questions regarding important social and cultural issues—by allowing them to be seen in a previously unavailable light. (Barone and Eisner, 2011, p. 122)

While I do not challenge the gist of Barone and Eisner’s position on this question, it is
important to clarify that a refusal to “impose a ‘correct’ alternate ideology” does not
mean that arts based research can occupy a “non-ideological” space. As we have seen,
the erasure of ideological perspectives serves only to buttress the dominant ideology
of the time, contributing to the idea that the status quo is “natural and inevitable.” As
Makus clarifies:
There exists no univocally true reality that people are either able or unable to recognize, nor
a given interpretation that is absolutely right or wrong. In Hall’s words, there is “no one to
one relationship between conditions of social existence we are living and how we experience
them.” This is not to say that ideologies cannot be false. They may provide maps of meaning
that mask the realities of economic and political relations, but they are not necessarily untrue
or inaccurate. Ideology expresses the way people live their relation between themselves and the
conditions of existence. Therefore, ideology is not like a building which one can exit; we are
necessarily in the building, and all we can do is choose how to decorate or remodel it. The issue
is how consciousness is produced and reproduced, not whether we can or should escape ideological formulation. It is a matter of which ideological formulations are engaged, not whether
we should have them. (1990, p. 500)

It is in sites like this, where categorical instability renders both ideological positionings
and non-ideological positionings as equally problematic, that queer theory is most useful. Purvis addresses this point as she discusses the problematic question of queer’s
disciplinary or ideological “home”:
My analysis raises another related issue, point of struggle, or moment of queer reckoning: the
search for home, like the family romance, is seductive, yet illusory and problematic…. the drive
towards home is not an effective political trajectory if home is constructed as a political, intellectual, or disciplinary space that is familiar, comfortable, and comforting—a place of stability
or sameness… (2011, p. 197)

Fundamental objectives [of queer theory] include: … opposing unjust and punitive regimes
of coherence that coerce and constrain us. If left unquestioned, [these regimes], supported by
patterns of thought and firmly entrenched hegemonic values (that maintain the superiority of
white, privileged, able-bodied male subjects), will continue to circulate, ensuring that such dominance will continue to be actualized, systemically. (Purvis, 2011, p. 193)

In refusing the comfortable, the familiar, the stable, and the same, queer refuses the
terms by which we have been asked to live, and the punitive processes by which these
terms are enforced. In doing so, a queer framework does resist the imposition of alternate “correct” ideologies. Instead, it poses a question that cannot be answered in stable
or singular terms: in refusing dominant narratives of being and knowing, what possibilities for being and knowing become visible, thinkable, and legible? “The invocation
of queerness,” Purvis argues, “… inevitably expands discursive limits, which leads to a
greater range of cultural intelligibility” (2011, p. 197, emphasis mine).
Within this definition of queer, Barone and Eisner’s proposition for the political framework of arts-based research seems quite compatible:
How can [transgressing against the totality of the master narrative] be achieved without the
researcher/artist/author herself assuming, albeit with sterling intentions, the role of unethical
totalitarian, positing a correct(ed) single view of social phenomena? They do so by, yes, first
offering more closely observed images and stories that defy the easy distortions and stereotypes
of various sorts of people in our society, especially the challenged, underprivileged, and dispossessed, that have come to be taken for granted by members of the public as accurate. But
they also achieve this by refusing to present an alternative master narrative in their own work.
Indeed, they may… think it highly arrogant and unethical for an arts based researcher to purport to have discovered a final truth, an unmediated reality about the essence of any inhabitants categorized within a society. The
epistemologically humble arts based researcher desires instead to offer small, closely observed,
local stories and portraits that invite readers (and viewers) to look again at what they think they
have already seen. But they achieve this by offering a degree of ambiguity—as opposed to an attitude of
certainty—in their research texts. (Barone and Eisner, 2011, p. 129, emphases mine)

Why subsume “queer” into a familiar, stable, and comforting ideological space (“[shoring] up the ragged boundaries of our shared interests and intellectual commitments,” as
Halberstam put it) (2011, p.7), when it is precisely these “stable” categories and spaces
that queer aims to dismantle?

Viewed in this way, both queer theory and arts based research could be said to be
implicit advocates of epistemic pluralism. Elizabeth Potter describes this philosophy
in opposition to “Type/Law Convergent Realism,” which (as you may recall) rests on
the ontological assumption of One True Description of reality—“Really Real Reality.”
Potter writes,
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[R]oughly, epistemic pluralism holds that Reality allows itself to be known through many categories, non-overlapping ones as well as overlapping, conflicting ones, and the categories we use
reflect our interests and values. (2006, p. 11)

Approaches that embrace epistemic pluralism, then, reject the presumption of the Really Real Reality in favor of the notion that realities are multiple, flexible, and knowable
through a variety of methods. The value of these methods is neither hierarchical nor
fixed. Rather, which approach is most useful depends on the nature of the questions
asked and the contexts in which the knowledge generated will be used. While an aim of
instability might cause discomfort to some, Hammers and Brown advise us to approach
such discomfort with excitement, rather than fear:
Such indeterminacy should not be uncomfortable; rather, [queer’s] uncertainty might be grounds
for potentiality, possibility and, as we will argue (at the risk of sounding humanist) emancipation out
of rationality and objectivity – the very principles which render invisible humanity’s complexity, variation and idiosyncrasy. Without sounding too trite, maybe this is our opportunity to put the human condition
back into the equation. (Hammers and Brown, 2004, p. 86, emphasis mine)

Therefore, to approach arts-based research from a queer perspective is not to replace
one totalizing ideology with another. Queer theory does not present a replacement
“answer” to questions of truth; rather, it seeks to reframe the question in a way that
welcomes a multiplicity of “answers.” In this way, arts based research is already ahead
of the game. Barone and Eisner write:
‘[Arts based research keeps] a watchful eye for the ruptures and the breaks and irregularities in
existence.’ This watchfulness implies a willingness to return to the ‘original difficulty of things’
by peering beneath the surface of the familiar, the obvious, the orthodox in a rescrutinizing
(re-searching) of the world. It is in adopting this interrogative disposition that arts based research
(like much art) promotes a level of dislocation, disturbance, disruptiveness, disequilibrium that
renders it sufficiently—even highly—useful, and therefore, in this unusual sense of the word,
truthful. (Barone and Eisner, 2011, p. 16)

As Nelson wrote, “Sometimes the shit stays messy,” (2016, p. 52). In a queer/arts based
research partnership, such messiness is not only legible in ways not afforded by dominant
ideologies, but desirable, and, as Barone and Eisner suggest, in a compelling way, “truthful.”
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Queer Theory
As the last section showed, queer theory can provide arts based research with a critical
framework from which to build a body of counterhegemonic knowledge without merely swapping out one potentially harmful ideology for another. Arts based research can
reciprocally help queer theory to circumnavigate some of the obstacles that prevent it
from achieving its own stated goals. Crucially, arts based research can provide queer
theory with a much-needed language through which to express its “truths” without
glossing over their complexity and nuance—and without collapsing back into implicit
support of worn and weary dominant narratives.

A Language Problem
Frankly speaking, queer theory has a language problem. The linguistic frameworks it
was born in—not just the written word, but the specifically academic written word—pose a
challenge to queer’s ability to deconstruct the systems that rest upon those frameworks.
This paradox recalls Black Lesbian Feminist writer Audre Lorde’s famous maxim: “The
master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house” (Lorde, 1987, p.110). The first
stumbling block queer usually trips over is the question of whether or not “queer”
constitutes an identity. Part of this confusion arises from the simultaneous usage of
the word “queer” as a sexual identity that either encompasses or rejects sexual identity
labels, and as a political identity that entirely rejects categorical thought. Colin Wilson
describes this confusion, and offers an explanation by way of Judith Butler:
A second ambiguity concerns the category “queer” itself. Is it a new and better identity, or does
it involve the rejection of identity politics altogether in favour of another way of organising?
Judith Butler has argued for the second of these possibilities: “My understanding of queer is a
term that desires that you don’t have to present an identity card before entering a meeting. Heterosexuals can join the queer movement. Bisexuals can join the queer movement. Queer is not
being lesbian. Queer is not being gay… Queer is an argument against [a] certain normativity,
what a proper lesbian or gay identity is.” (Wilson, 2011)

While Butler’s positioning of queer as an argument rather than an identity is useful in
the context of queer theory, it is a difficult definition for language to accommodate.
73

For example, at least in English, the “to be” verb makes no distinction between permanent and temporary states: “I am white,” is the same “am” as in, “I am hungry,” or
“I am young.” Because it is difficult for language to clarify this distinction, dominant
interpretations have their run of the place when it comes to conceptualizing identity.
Since dominant ideologies presume that identities are stable, the statement “I am gay,”
is presumed to be a permanent state, and nothing within the language forestalls that interpretation. In the case of sexual identities, both the “I” and the category are presumed
stable—if I’m gay, I’m gay forever. Neither the definition of “gay” nor my identification
with it is expected to do much changing.
Even within categories where it can be presumed that a person might identify differently
over the course of time—political identities, for example—there is a presumption of
stability on the side of the category, if not the person. Within dominant frameworks,
“I am a Communist,” may reasonably be assumed to mean roughly the same thing
no matter who identifies with the term, or when. While the “am” is flexible enough to
encompass both permanent and temporary states, it is not specific enough to distinguish between the two, meaning that any but the most explicitly clarified statements of
identity will be absorbed into hegemonic interpretations. Thus, the ambiguity of this
language may easily be exploited by hegemonic ideas—collapsing into “commonsense”
interpretations of identification. What this means for “queer” is that the limitations of
language make it very difficult to conceptualize identification with an approach that
explicitly rejects stability, totality, and permanence. Simply put, there is no easy language with which to talk about queer conceptions of identification—“queerness,” within dominant frameworks, is rendered illegible. Hammers and Brown summarize one
critique of “queer” on these grounds:

Figure 6: 2016 Headlines, The Guardian; The Mary Sue

Fuss (1989) asserts that ‘place can never be entirely displaced’. In other words, Fuss is taking to
task the anti-essentialist/deconstructionist position that there is no such thing as essence, since
in the end they depend on some ‘thing’ (i.e., essence) to make their case. One can see this with
queer theory – their desire to dismantle identity depends on the identification of ‘queer’. Fuss
also argues that our very language is comprised of categories and taxonomies, making the ability
to evade dichotomous thought impossible. (Hammers and Brown, 2004, p. 97)

This is a common enough criticism, and, within the confines of written language, a
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relatively valid one. (Though to give credit to writers, it must be said that there is a
difference between resisting “taxonomy” and resisting “dichotomy.” Arguably, some
especially creative writers do manage the latter.) Queer’s stated goal of abolishing categories is, admittedly, an impossible one. And yet, how many lives will improve if efforts
toward such an impossible goal yield, for example, a multiplicity of new gender spaces?
(As indeed they already have: see Fig. 6).
Further, accepting the necessity of a linguistic framework—taxonomies and all—is a far
cry from accepting those taxonomies as truth. I may accept that I need a LinkedIn profile in order to get a job in my chosen field, but that doesn’t mean that I or anyone else
believes that all that I am is encompassed in that profile. The notion that language is the
only, or even the best, way of expressing meaning disguises the “truth” of any meanings
not legible within linguistic frameworks. In The Argonauts, Maggie Nelson describes a
comic written by her partner, the genderqueer artist Harry Dodge (Fig. 7).
One interpretation of Dodge’s clever comic is as a description a gendered position that
is “illegible” to linguistic frameworks; the necessity of using language to render his genderqueerness “visible” simultaneously obscures the nuance of his individually gendered
self. As such, expanding the linguistic possibilities for gender identification may help to
visualize non-normative gender configurations, but the act of importing those previously illegible configurations into the taxonomies of language does come at a price. This is
the tragic paradox of the symbolic: that which makes visible simultaneously obscures.
And while this process may not evaporate if the language in use replaces words with
image (or music, or dance), each language exposes different nuances from the others.
What happens if we exchange Dodge’s sheet for a healthy coating of flour? A smattering of lasers? Blueberry jam? A bucket of pig’s blood? Each reveals something different
about the obscured, underlying shape. As such, those who privilege discursive language
fail to understand what artists always have: materiality matters. Even when the material
is language.

Figure 7: “Without this sheet I would be invisible,”
Harry Dodge (n/d)

Thus, queer theory’s reliance on language presents a problem that can only be addressed by the application of a multiplicity of languages toward its goals. Barone and
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Eisner write:
There is another sense in which theory functions in arts-based research. That other sense pertains to the fact that forms of representation are expressive and make their contribution by rendering vividly some aspect of the world at hand. How, for example, a family converses around
the dinner table is something that requires more attention to language… body language… subtle cues… Arts based research can make such body language vivid in ways that discursive language is unlikely to reveal. Arts based research can provide the stuff that researchers can use to
promote theoretical understanding of the traditional sort – thus, out of connoisseurship come
opportunities to generate conventional theory. (Barone and Eisner, 2011, p. 157)

Barone and Eisner also point out that academia already employs its own multiplicity of
languages to render a clearer picture of the subject at hand:
We often talk about the desirability of diversity in academia especially as it pertains to racial,
gender, or class diversity. But other forms of diversity in academia seem equally important. For
example, one can have diverse paradigms employed—that is, theories that provide a distinctive
focus on the issue being addressed. For example, a Freudian perspective on a family relationship
can reveal qualities that pertain to defensiveness or regression or egoism. The same situation addressed from the vantage point of cognitive therapy conceives of and addresses the phenomena
in very different terms. However, these two situations—one cognitive, the other Freudian—all
operate within a straightforward linguistic frame. (2011, p. 157)

Academia already acknowledges the value of diverse approaches—within its own limitations and frameworks. It is the job of counterhegemonic knowledge producers—like,
for example, the queer arts based researcher—to employ their own diverse intellectual
tools to interrogate and explode those frameworks. Objectivity, legibility, authority, certainty, linearity: these are just some of the standards that a counterhegemonic knowledge practice refuses to take as given. Barone and Eisner write:
[Most researchers] want to know for sure that they have directly affected some facet of the world
that they are able to influence. Yet, as we have said, the quest for certainty… is a hopeless pursuit. We will never know whether what we know is for certain.
This realization transforms research of all kinds—but especially arts based research—into a
process that is pervaded by dialectic activity in which ideas are held tentatively rather than
permanently and where conclusions are always partial and temporary. Indeed, the history of
science (like the history of art) is a history of changed minds. (2011, p. 53)

Rejecting the notion that “truth” is necessarily structured by certainty, permanence,
and stability is a huge blow to the maintenance of hegemonic ideologies as “natural
and inevitable.” If truth is multiple, contextual, and temporal, then who’s to say that
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the status quo is “natural,” “right,” or worth defending? While such an approach to
knowledge does not necessarily loosen the vice grip that hegemony holds on power, it
does destabilize its ideological foundations. After all, a monolith must wobble before it
may topple, no?

Subjectivity
A re-framing of knowledge with an emphasis on the subjective further draws upon the
strengths of both queer theory and arts based research. First, it is important to clarify
that “subjectivity” is not synonymous with “individuality”—a common misinterpretation when it comes to evaluating the potential of subjective knowledge practices. Barrett
writes:
Accounts of irreducible difference (socially constructed knowledge), leads to relativism and a
state in which only power can determine what counts as truth; together these accounts of knowledge constitute the “god trick”. It endorses the “conquering gaze from nowhere” that claims
the power to see, and not be seen, and the view from everywhere, which is effectively the same
thing. (Barrett, 2006, p.8)

In this passage, Barrett charts the danger inherent in this misinterpretation: if there is
no “objectivity,” then anyone’s interpretation of the world may be considered “truth.”
If that’s the case, then clearly, those in power will manipulate and appropriate this
“truth” to serve their own aims. (One might notice this logic at work in the Trump
administration’s deployment of “alternative facts,” which cleverly but bizarrely appropriates postmodern ontologies of the multiplicity of truth to twist its own interests into
the shape of “fact.”) One might also note that this is more or less the same process that
occurs when we presume the possibility of “objective” knowledge as well; power uses
the disguise of “objectivity” to mask its own partisanship. This formulation may seem
to be something of a Catch-22. When the truth must be objective, power appropriates
it. When the truth must be subjective, power appropriates it.
So… what now?
This problem may be substantially mediated by interrogating the difference between
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“subjectivity” and “individualism.” For “subjective” knowledge to pull its
counterhegemonic weight, our definition of subjectivity must encompass
not only the individual “subject,” but that subject as they relate to and are
constituted by social processes. As Hammers and Brown make clear, “subjectivity is a socially mediated process.” They continue, “[One] is always already situated in the social world, thus the social and the individual are in a
dialectical relationship that involves continuous re-negotiation” (Hammers
and Brown, 2004, p. 90). Far from emphasizing the individual perspective,
then, an emphasis on subjectivity understands reality to be a concept constructed in collectivity: inextricably bound up with the social world. As such,
claims to “objective” knowledge are equally as silly as claims to “individual” knowledge; both imply the possibility of rendering broad “truths” from
singular perspectives—whether “objective” and omniscient, or “individual”
and unaffected by the social/collective. Thus, when we talk about “subjectivity,” we are talking about “the social and the individual… in a dialectical
relationship” as Hammers and Brown put it (2004, p. 90). Viewed through
this lens, Barone and Eisner’s vision for arts based research—a vision that
has a decidedly queer ring to it—is activated:
… although these examples [of arts based research projects] are the results of
careful scrutinizing of certain aspects of the social world, none makes the sorts
of knowledge claims that traditional social researchers offer. None suggests that
their view of the highlighted phenomena represents finally correct descriptions,
interpretations, or judgments. They are not designed to reinforce stereotypical
take-for-granted notions of what it means to attend to the physical world around
us, to be homeless in America, or to think about the place of the body in educational activities. Indeed, quite the opposite is the case. Each possesses the capacity
to disrupt our comfortable assumptions about these thoroughly human phenomena. (2011, p. 18)

And while such a rejection of “comfortable assumptions” could indeed
be taken from within other traditional frameworks of academic research
(discursive language, linearity, legibility, etc.), Barone and Eisner argue that
the use of arts based approaches afford the audience a heightened position
of distance—an “aesthetic remove” from traditional approaches that gives
greater gravity to the experience of encountering a familiar world anew:
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[It] may be precisely because this world [seen through an arts based lens] is indeed plausible,
as opposed to conventionally ‘real,’ that a healthy distance may form between the viewer and
her stale images of taken-for-granted reality. Being transported, at least momentarily, into an
“aesthetic remove,” the viewer may be coaxed into viewing her own mundane realities from an
unfamiliar—and perhaps disturbing—angle. (Barone and Eisner, 2011, p. 21)

What Barone and Eisner describe is, ultimately, a central goal of counterhegemonic
knowledge production: to shed light on the familiar world in such a way as to expose
the deeply imbalanced, unjust, and oppressive forces that structure it. And, of course,
to imagine the world anew.

Practice and Product: Toward Teaching and
Making Counterhegemonic Knowledge
The process of translating this critical framework into concrete research and teaching
practices is, ultimately, beyond the scope of this paper. However, other scholars have
suggested a number of more grounded positionings from which to do the work of
creating and teaching the creation of counterhegemonic knowledge through the arts.
Barrett writes:
A problem confronting many artistic researchers is related to the need for the artist to write
about his or her own work in the research report or exegesis. The outcomes of such research
are not easily quantifiable and it can be difficult to articulate objectively methods, processes, and
conclusions that emerge from an alternative logic of practice and the intrinsically subjective
dimension of artistic production. Moreover, conventional approaches and models of writing
about art generally fall within the domain of criticism, a discourse that tends to focus on connoisseurial evaluation of the finished product. (2006, p.1)

It seems, then, that one site of intervention could engage researchers and students to
develop genres and discourses of writing that better address the “alternative logic of
practice” and the “intrinsically subjective dimensions” of producing arts based knowl81

Ekphrasis: a tradition of writing that
poetically and dramatically describes
works of art.

edge. Toward this end, arts-integrative techniques—for example, importing
conventions of ekphrastic writing to one’s own work, particularly toward
the description of artistic processes and knowledges accumulated rather
than final products. Indeed, reflection on the process of building arts based
knowledge through a more familiar medium may help to bridge what can
be a difficult gap between thinking in dominant logics and the “alternative
logics” of the arts. (And though I cannot support this claim beyond anecdotal evidence, my experience as a RISD Writing Center tutor leads me to suspect that many art students crave the opportunity to reflect on the logics of
their artmaking through a subjective lens—and often attempt to wedge this
kind of writing into otherwise professional or traditionally scholarly writing,
where it is largely unwelcome.)
Toward this point, Barrett suggests an emphasis on practice over product,
writing: “[One] way of overcoming such a dilemma is for creative arts researchers to shift the critical focus away from the notion of the work as
product, to an understanding of both studio enquiry and its outcomes as
process” (2006, p.1). Drawing upon Foucault’s “What is An Author,” Barrett
attempts to:
… explore how we might move away from art criticism to the notion of a critical
discourse of practice-led enquiry that involves viewing the artist as a researcher,
and the artist/critic as a scholar who examines the value of artistic process as the
production of knowledge. (2006, p.1)

Barrett argues that in this process of practice-emphasis, the relationship between the artistic process and the artist’s written reflection becomes crucial
if the work is to contribute to the overall project of scholarship—of the
generation of theory. Barrett writes:
[Philosopher Martin] Heidegger argues that we do not come to “know” the world
theoretically through contemplative knowledge in the first instance. Rather, we
come to know the world theoretically only after we have come to understand it
through handling. Thus the new can be seen to emerge in the involvement with
materials, methods, tools and ideas of practice. It is not just the representation
of an already formed idea nor is it achieved through conscious attempts to be
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original.
Rather than constituting a relationship between circulating discourses (Foucault) or image and
image/text (implied by Carter’s ‘material thinking’), materialising practices constitute relationships between material processes and text - of which the first iteration is necessarily the researcher’s own self-reflexive mapping of the emergent work as enquiry. In artistic research, a dialogic
relationship between studio practice and the writing of the creative arts exegesis is crucial to
articulating and harnessing studio methodologies for further application beyond the field of
creative arts so that the practice as research extends the general field of research and is validated
alongside other more traditional forms of research derived essentially from the scientific method. (2006, p. 6)

Barrett’s argument for the tracking of the artist’s thinking through “reflexive mapping
of the emergent work as enquiry” seems a compelling option for those who do indeed
hope their research will be “validated alongside other more traditional forms of research.” However, researchers and educators hoping to tread this path ought do so cautiously, since the danger of this practice is that it once again subsumes artistic languages
and logics into a hierarchical value system that necessitates the explication of the arts in
discursive language to confirm their scholarly value. As Makus writes:
Although linguistic and social structures exhibit tendencies, they do not guarantee outcomes.
Structure is actively reproduced through practice. It is important, however, not to err in the
opposite direction by making a practice a fetish. Practices do not occur in isolation, but are
constrained through structure. In the reciprocal relationship between structure and practice,
structure is actively produced and reproduced through practice just as practice is constrained by
structure. (1990, p. 500-01)

Practice both produces and is constrained by structure (“Without this sheet, I would be
invisible”). For this reason, it is crucial to the practice of counterhegemonic knowledge
production that those constraining structures be actively and systemically addressed—
either by arts based researchers or those who educate them. As we have seen, these structural constraints do their very best to remain invisible—and as such, creating knowledge
that dissents to dominant constructions of reality necessitates that those structures be
exposed before they may be deconstructed. This may be a radical approach to knowledge construction, but it does not necessitate a radical departure from the material
one might normally engage in the classroom. Art and art history are just as steeped in
the machinations of power, privilege, and dominant ideologies as academia—and may
themselves provide an excellent entry point into larger conversations of hegemony and
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John Berger’s
Ways of Seeing
(1972) demonstrates several
approaches to this
project—a good
starting place for art
educators wondering how to integrate
structural critique
into their lessons.

structural inequality and bias.
Finally, Foucault—by way of Deacon—and Barone and Eisner all seem to
agree that for a practice of arts based research and teaching to succeed,
the artist/researcher/educator must take a humble and flexible approach to
their practice. Deacon writes:
If we wish to think differently about, or bring about changes in, these pedagogical
institutions, theories, and practices which have made us what we are, the concept of lifelong teaching proposes a potentially transgressive, perpetual process
of self-transformation, which, through exemplary practices, may in turn impact
upon wider social transformation. (2006, p. 185)

Along these same lines, Barone and Eisner emphasize the importance of
resisting authorial certainty and finality, and of sharing power—in whatever
form it comes—with knowledge-making collaborators:
[The] ethical arts based researcher must be open to engaging—sharing power
with—informants and readers in a textual conversation. This means forgoing a
tone of certainty and finality that (sometimes strident and sometimes subtle) freezes out the possibilities of alternate meanings to social phenomena. (Barone and
Eisner, 2011 p. 134)

I end on this note as a reminder—to myself as well as my readers—that
the process of forging new paths is a tricky one, on which we all, inevitably,
stumble. Ideologies operate through us all, and by approaching the project
with humility and flexibility, one may simultaneously resist conducting hegemonic ideologies through their own selves, and concede that such a resistance can never be total. To do so acknowledges that the project of making
knowledge that fights back against the oppressive, dominant, hegemonic
formulations that structure our social worlds is a goal worthy of humbling
oneself to.
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Conclusions
The process of making new knowledge is far from neutral. The standards by which
we assess the value and legitimacy of contributions to our collective knowledge bank
are deeply biased: resting ideologically, systemically, and formally on institutions and
processes that are firmly rooted in systems of power and oppression. As a result, our
current body of “legitimate” or scholarly knowledge presents only a partial, partisan
picture of what it is possible—and worthwhile—to know. Indeed, these hegemonic institutions and processes rely on two central notions: (1) that their methods are “objective,” “value-neutral,” or otherwise impartial (2) that these methods are the best—if
not the only—ones through which reality may be accessed and communicated. As
this paper has demonstrated, each of these assumptions is gravely flawed. The casting
of any knowledge process as “objective” or “value-neutral” belies the impossibility of
achieving either standard, instead reframing the language of power as the only unbiased language—and therefore the only language by which real truth may be accessed
and communicated. Academic institutions—far from opposing such a miscarriage of
knowledge—are imbricated in a hierarchical system that rewards them for maintaining
this epistemic singularity. It is through their maintenance of a monopoly over “legitimate” knowledge production that academic institutions maintain the prestige, wealth,
and cultural capital upon which their power is founded.
The consequences of these processes are significant. They maintain an ideologically
biased monopoly over access to “truth” to the exclusion of those ways of knowing that
might challenge their power—power that is deeply wrapped up in systems like white
supremacy, sexism, heterosexism, and capitalism. It is systems like these, then, that hegemonic processes of knowledge production ultimately uphold.
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Practitioners and advocates of both arts based research and queer theory have, each
in their own way, levied critiques and resistances to this singular, hegemonic system of
knowledge production. Arts based research holds that arts languages—be they image,
movement, music, performance, writing, or otherwise—have equal claim to the creation of knowledge as do traditional approaches. The particular knowledges available
through the languages of the arts are largely illegible within those traditional frameworks—which accounts not only for their exclusion from dominant conceptions of
knowledge production but also for their value. Through the arts, “local” knowledges,
truths, and ways of being not recognized by traditional frameworks may be made visible, legible, and digestible, and knowable.

and material harms that such systems perpetrate—but any attempt to approach such an
overwhelming task would certainly do well to ground itself in a broad and potent body
of counterhegemonic knowledge. Purvis asks us to look ahead to the “queer horizon,”
and this is an appropriate metaphor for the task this thesis has laid out. “Horizon”—as
we artists know—is a fiction of the visual; it’s the place where the ground and the sky
finally meet, which of course, they do not. The horizon exists only in two dimensions: a
theoretical proposition. In three, it transforms to an impossible aspiration—a constantly
moving goal post. In queerness, as in art, we work to imagine the sites where our lofty
ideals might rest easily on practical ground. As we approach, these sites recede, but this
is the promise of both queer theory and arts based research: for while the destination
may be aspirational, fictive, and impossible, the ground covered in its pursuit is not.

Queer theory approaches knowledge making in a complementary fashion—embracing
not only a diversity of approaches, but also a diversity of knowledges and truths. In
contrast to arts based research, however, queer theory takes an explicitly counterhegemonic approach that seeks simultaneously to resist the dominant narratives that uphold
structures of power and oppression and to affirm ways of being and knowing that exist
outside of, and in opposition to, those narratives. As Purvis writes:
Queer concerns, intentions, politics, strategies, and agendas ask not that minority subjects simply strive for inclusion or remain in the margins of the non-normative, but ask that we get inside
and shake things up, that we look back at a legacy of oppressive regimes and their intrinsic
harms, and also look ahead, to persistent regimes and their potential demise—to the queer
horizon (2011, p. 199).

As such, arts based research and queer theory have much to offer one another. To approach the creation of knowledge—and the creation of knowledge creators—from a
queer and arts based framework is to reject the notion that the worlds we live in and
the languages we speak are the only ones possible—or the only ones valuable. It is to
affirm the possibility of knowledges that are local, situated, unstable, unspeakable, and
contradictory, and to imagine worlds outside the oppressive systems that invisibly structure our lives.
Of course, it will take more than a queer methodological pluralism to remedy the serious
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APPENDIX A: ESSAY

Queerly Rendered, or: How to Draw a
Lesbian
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“Queer’s main goal is in the debunking of the very notion of stability. That is, queer focuses on the potentialities and subversions that lie behind gender ambiguity and indeterminacy,
therefore calling into question and problematizing all categorical thought… It is thus the
task of a queer methodology to account for the construction of identity as opposed to its
reification.”
“The limits of our language do not define the limits of our understanding.”
…

Hammers &
Brown, 2004, p. 95.

Barone & Eisner,
2011, p. 158.

How do you draw a lesbian?
Arguably, it can’t be done. In my LGBT studies class in college, Professor
Henry (who goes by Astrid) asks, “Why is it that gay and lesbian are something we are, not something we do?”
Historically, same-sex sexual behavior is much more common than gay, lesbian, bisexual or queer identity. The Greeks practiced normalized pederasty; young men in a tribe in New Guinea routinely performed oral sex on
younger men before going on to partner and reproduce with adult women;
most Native American societies accommodated “third genders,” or people
who took on the social roles—including the sexual ones—of the “opposite”
sex; medieval Europeans lumped anal sex between people of any sexes to be
the same brand of “sodomy”—and I could go on. Even in our relatively
welcoming modern climate, collegiate “experimentation” between women
is racy, but regular—and the phenomenon of straight men on the down-low,
that is, men who engage in occasional-to-regular sex with other men, but
maintain otherwise heterosexual lives, is well-documented. And yet, sexual
identity still ranks highly when it comes to modern constructions of self.
Why is it that this primacy, this selfhood, is invested in our sexual selves?
Most of us would never reduce ourselves thusly to other categories of preference, say, the clothes we wear, or our choice of takeout joint. First, because
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Jagose, 1996,
p. 8.

these seems like silly—even frivolous—ways to categorize people. Second
because, in the course of a life—heck, in the course of a day—our tastes
vary. Our appetites change. The same could be said, of course, of our sex
lives.
So why is it that a dyke is something I am, while ordering egg foo young is
just something I happen to be doing?
—

Winterson, 1997,
p. 103.

“I was in a bookshop recently when a young woman approached me.
She told me she was writing an essay on my work and that of Radclyffe
Hall. Could I help?
‘Yes,’ I said. ‘Our work has nothing in common.’
‘I thought you were a lesbian,’ she said.”
—
I’m pretty sure my grandmother—Tobey Prinz, née Flora Silbert—was
queer. My father, without prejudice, says, no, no, she was never romantic
with women. That may be so, but it’s beside the point. She changed her
name from Flora to Tobey.

the slightest romantic interest in a man, despite numerous chances. As an
adolescent, she never presumed (or even imagined) “marriage to a picket-fence future.” She had two lengthy, emotionally intimate, co-habitating
relationships: both with women. The first, Ellen Starr, wrote to Addams of
their shared bed, of Starr’s wish to “excite and tempt” Addams by “kissing
[her] fifteen times this minute.” The second, Mary Rozet Smith, “fussed
over [Addams], carried her shawl, handkerchief, and crackers; traveled with
her; washed her hair; bought her clothes; buoyed her in health; tended her
in illness.”
—
As far as conversation goes, my grandmother is a pretty sexy topic. Lifelong
Communist, charter member of the Chicago Teachers’ Union, co-founder
of the Rogers Park Tenants’ Association, champion of Chicago’s “Save the
Beaches” campaign, Tobey named her sons for Marx and Engels, was eulogized by Studs Terkel and Harold Washington, and was buried between
Emma Goldman and her (my grandmother’s) second husband. All this is
documented in a 400-page-thick file of FBI surveillance (PDF’ed for my
convenience—thank you, Freedom of Information Act).
This list goes over great at liberal arts colleges and young lefty potlucks.

—
Another professor of mine, Victoria Brown, has been in a self-defined decades long, “very long-distance relationship” with another Chicago social
reformer: nineteenth-century Progressive activist Jane Addams. In 2005,
Brown, an Addams scholar and biographer, was asked by queer historian
George Chauncey to give a lecture speaking to the ongoing historical debate
regarding the nature of Addams’ sexuality.

“I know two things for sure,” Brown writes. “Jane Addams was queer. And
Jane Addams would use one of her favorite words—‘stupid’—to describe
our discussion here tonight.”

To this point, Brown recited a litany of evidences: Addams never showed

My father recalls accompanying Tobey to gather signatures during the Save
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—
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the Beaches campaign, which, during the 1950s, successfully petitioned the City of Chicago to thwart encroaching developers and purchase a long stretch of urban beachfront
for public use. The two of them trudged the sandy shores, soliciting bathers to sign the
petitions. At one point the campaign gathered 30,000 Rogers Park signatures—out of a
total 55,000 neighborhood residents at the time.
I imagine her as I’ve seen her in photos—dark wool skirts, smiling face, serious eyes—
with a clipboard in one hand and my young father in tow, weaving through towels and
bright beach umbrellas. Dutifully, lovingly laboring to secure the public right to these
pleasures: a cool lake breeze in the hot sun and a summer afternoon outside, in the
company of neighbors.
—
Brown: “I am seldom visited by Jane Addams. Before my drive into Chicago today,
she’d spoken to me just a few times in all our eighteen years together. But today she
was in the car. ‘There are how many homeless children in Chicago these days?’ she
asked me. ‘How many teenage kids needing jobs? How much is being spent every
month in Iraq—a billion dollars, for heaven’s sake? And you’re driving to Chicago to
talk about my private life?’”
—
You can draw a woman with a fresh butch buzz, a tapered shoulder-wide plaid, and a
septum ring (like a bull—a nod to slurs past and revived and reclaimed and once again
past). You can draw two women kissing—on a corner, in a hot tub, at the altar—hell,
you could even draw them fucking each other. But can you really say you’ve drawn a
lesbian? Can you even say for certain you’ve drawn women? Is “identity” (as it were) a
purely linguistic conceit?
Is it possible you’ve just drawn two people fucking?
—
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“Well, maybe…” my friend Shani says, eyes fixed in concentration, appraising my proposition,
“… but don’t you think people will still just see them as a lesbians?”
—
bell hooks says that spaces of noncomprehension are particularly fertile,
pedagogically speaking. “Such a space provides… the opportunity to listen
without ‘mastery,’ without owning or possessing speech through interpretation.”
—
I suppose if we decided on a sign—maybe like the one “recycling” has—we
could just draw that.
“But we already do,” Michael—another professor—says. “We can just write
the word ‘lesbian.’”
—
At the ceremony for the rededication of a Rogers Park beach in Tobey’s
name, I am given a rough section of a low white wall to paint. On my computer phone, I call up images of the fathers themselves, Tobey’s sons’ namesakes: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. I get to work sketching them out
in bright jewel tones. They are pretty good likenesses, I think. My opinion
is confirmed when a bleached-blonde woman, strolling by, stops and asks,
“Why… are you painting these men?”
She has an accent I place somewhere in Eastern Europe and her face is
dark, or maybe her accent has just cast it in shadow as I am thrown back to
Prague, where I’d visited a few years before during my junior year abroad.
The Communist Museum. Artifacts of suffering. Artifacts of repression.
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Artifacts of scarcity. Of lingering anger. These thoughts strobe behind my eyes as the
woman stares me down.

How do you draw a lesbian?
Well, how do you write one?

Or perhaps she waits, innocently, for my reply.
—
“But they are only theorists!” I am thinking, defending myself from a criticism levied
only by a shadow that I have, perhaps, imagined.
“It’s not like I’ve drawn Stalin.”
I have the good sense or shyness not to say this aloud.

A woman attracted to women? If so, how much attraction does one have
to have? How about the wave of gratitude and warm will I feel when a
classmate notes the deep blueness of my eyes? How about Astrid, my professor: her magnetic charisma, the grades I earned in aim of impressing my
worth upon her? And what of the desire I feel for my grandmother? A dead
relative, sure, but a woman nonetheless. One from whom I crave closeness,
affirmation, a conspiracy of some shared sense of self—even from the great
beyond.

—
What happened in 1967? Among other things: all the authors dropped dead, together,
all at once.

—

—

“Smith-Rosenberg’s point was that American women in the mid-nineteenth
century defined ‘sex’ as that which one did with men, so whatever women
did together was, by definition, not sex.

I am trying to express to the blonde woman that here, in this specific place at one specific time, these men’s ideas wrote a map for my grandmother and her community to
block the corporate development of this and many other urban beaches. This beautiful
walk on this beautiful day, made possible by Grandma Tobey, Karl Marx, and viewers
like you.
But as I am explaining, my dad pulls me aside.
I’m sorry, he says, but we can’t talk about her Communism. There is a sharp edge of anxiety in
his voice and in how he holds my shoulder. Uncle Freddy left it out of the proposal and we don’t
know… we don’t know if the City would like it—
I have heard enough, and tell him so, and depart to the dock to be huffy.
—
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Subsequently, the research of historians like Lillian Faderman and Leila
Rupp has demonstrated that female partnerships could be devoted, loving,
sentimental, and romantic without engaging in physical sex.”
—
“Attraction,” then, is perhaps too sticky—so maybe a lesbian is a woman
who fucks women. But what specific acts of “fucking” qualify her thus? In
a culture where the predominant definition of the word is the act of specifically penile penetration, can two women even fuck? But wait, two women
can—so long as one of them has a penis. What, again, is a woman? It’s
not a genital proposition, no, surely we’ve moved past the bigotry of that
reduction. Do we rely on chromosomes? Perception? Flawed, presumptive,
103

Brown, 2005.

in turn.
Self-identification?

In truth, she said nothing at all.
But in my memory, she replied, with exhaustion, “Why do you care?”

So you can draw a lesbian, as long as she’s got a speech bubble proclaiming
it?
—
“The ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ of wedded folk
Is often quite confusing
And sometimes when they use the ‘ours’
It sounds almost amusing
But you and I may well defy
Both married folk and single
To do as well as we have done
The ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ to mingle.”

qtd. Brown, 2005

- Jane Addams, untitled, undated poem to Mary Rozet Smith
—
After several months, I asked the straight woman I was dating:
“Are you straight?”
She refused to answer. So I asked, “Do you love me? Care for me? Enjoy the
sex we have?”
“Yes, yes, yes,” she replied.
“Are these things related to each other in your mind? Do they exist in the
same galaxy of feeling?”
“Yes,” she replied.
“Do you intend to keep seeing me?”
“Yes.”
“Are you straight?”
104

—
My dad, Howard Karl Schein, was born in 1944—the same year Joe McCarthy became a Republican. He’d be a U.S. Senator by the time Howie turned three.
My dad’s mom, a card-carrying Communist, was under government surveillance for
more than two decades.
When I come back to the low wall, my drawings have been painted over in a thick white
wash.
—
The problem with drawing is that image’s signs are terribly unfixed. Even the avowedly
abstract image cannot divorce itself from semiotics entirely—and the vast possibilities
for interpretation render image a necessarily unstable purveyor of meaning. This is why
language is so much better suited to, if not the creation, then at least the communication of
knowledge. It’s a question of clarity, is it not?
—
Yes, I say: image is too unstable to bear the weight of concrete meaning. Too unfixed,
too interpretable—that is, misinterpretable! Yet look at all the weight the linguistic beast
can bear! How strong it must be—(and how stable!)—to mean so many things, all at
once:
Queer (n.): With the: that which is queer. Rare.
Queer (adj.): Strange, odd, peculiar, eccentric.
Queer (adj.): Also: of questionable character; suspicious, dubious.
105

Selected definitions from the
Oxford English
Dictionary online,
accessed March 5,
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Queer (adj.): As an intensifier, e.g. “A queer deal,” a great amount.
Queer (adj.): Out of sorts; unwell; faint; giddy. (Slang): drunk.
Queer (n.): colloq. (Freq. derogatory). A homosexual; esp. a male homosexual.
Queer (v.): To cause (a person) to feel queer; to disconcert, perturb, unsettle.

Does it make us feel better—less seasick, perhaps—to see this hardy list of
denotations, all neat and stacked like Jenga bricks?
—

—
When I return from Chicago, I recount the story of the Communist portraits to my sympathetic roommates as the lentils simmer for community
dinner.
“It was like, here’s our radical political history being literally whitewashed,”
I am righteously yelling between sips of Pabst Blue Ribbon. My ankles are
crossed and resting on the table: one monogrammed Nike high-top over the
other.
—
The second straight woman I dated hated lesbians. She would lie beside
me and proclaim this hatred—of our butchness, our fashion, our sidelong
appraisal of men. One Sunday morning, fed up, I exclaimed to the woman
resting in the crook of my arm: “You do know that I am a lesbian, right?”
—

Selected definitions from the
Oxford English
Dictionary online,
accessed March 5,
2017.

Queer (adj.): Denoting or relating to a sexual or gender identity that does not correspond to
established ideas of sexuality and gender, especially heterosexual norms.
Queer (adj.): Counterfeit, forged.
Queer (adj.): Bad, contemptible, untrustworthy, disreputable.
Queer (v.): To make a fool of, ridicule; to swindle, cheat; to get the better of.
Queer (v.): To ask, inquire; to question.
Queer (v.): Later: to puzzle, flummox, baffle, confound.
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I thought it was funny, in that sad way things can be: the irony of the lesbian-hating woman, griping, naked, in another woman’s bed.
At the time, I did not understand the way a word can be a blanket to some,
and a strip-search to others.
I suppose the irony depends on your definition of the word naked.
—
Part of the problem is the distance between the “am” I always am and the
“am” I am right now, and right here.
How do you draw a contextual state? Well, how do you write one?
—
“I think that Addams should not be termed a lesbian. Queer, yes; gay, no.
I take this political and historical position because the terms lesbian and gay
are significant, conscious assertions of sexual behavior as central to social
identity. They call up a sense of community cohesion based on a shared investment in same-sex eroticism, and I know that Jane Addams did not look
to eroticism to define herself or her community.”
—
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How do you draw a lesbian?
They say that cellular regeneration in the human body runs in seven year
cycles; that is, every seven years, every cell in your body has replicated and
died. You are—in the basest material sense—a wholly new person. And yet,
you’re still the same you, are you not?
Are you the same you that you were seven years ago?
—

“Repair,” Cornucopia: New and
Selected Poems,
Molly Peacock.

Broken the clock to find the tick
dissolved the stamp to find the lick
—

APPENDIX B: IMAGE SET
Like and Like and Like

Have you drawn a lesbian?
(… two “women” kissing, a fresh butch buzz, a professor-crush, a name
change, a day spent lounging the beach in the shade of a family tree…)
I suppose I’ll believe it when I see it.
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The images that follow were created in concert with this thesis as a way to investigate
ideas both directly and indirectly related to its written content, and as a way of developing my own practice around the combination of queer and arts based approaches
to knowledge. In particular, I wanted to visually explore the spaces made possible by
speaking through written language versus the language of image. This led me to consider the metaphor of hegemonic ideologies—including those posited by the privileging
of written language—as an “administrative grid” that both restricts the possibilities
of expression and constitutes its own, unique, and often uniquely beautiful, medium.
Exploring these questions visually afforded me the opportunity to think deeply through
these analogies and finally to explore the question of the materiality of the grid: in understanding that ideologies are inescapable, how might we create “grids” that are softer,
more flexible, or more organic?
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Figure 10: “Porcupine taxonomy,”
Zoe Schein, 2017.

Figure 8: “Like and like and like and like...” Zoe Schein, 2017.

Figure 11: “Coyote
taxonomy,” Zoe
Schein, 2017.

Figure 9: “... but what is the thing beneath the semblance of the thing?”
Zoe Schein, 2017.
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Figure 12: “Tree and tree (graphed),” Zoe Schein, 2017.

Figure 12: “Tree and tree (graphed),” Zoe Schein, 2017.
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Figure 14: “Telephone cords,” Zoe Schein, 2017.

Figure 15: “Corn time,” Zoe Schein, 2017.

Figure 16: “Knit,” Zoe Schein, 2017.
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